turn any llama-server into a jev system one endpoint
Python
3
1 commits
updated Sep 20, 2026
an open source, self-hosted alternative to typesafe's jev and its system one api. verdict serves the same wire protocol on your own hardware, so an existing jev client changes its base url and nothing else.
a small python server sits in front of your existing llama-server or llama-swap endpoint with any model of your choosing and serves a jev compatible API.
answer typed questions about a piece of text without generating any text.
one forward pass, read the probability the model puts on each declared option label, renormalise over them. the answer is a distribution over option ids, with the confidence signals needed to decide whether to act on it.
the shape of it, one question from the hacker news demo:
question: which of these links opens the story's comments?
options: A "229 comments" B "Hacker News" C "hide" D "past"
answer: a distribution over A-D, plus the option mass that landed on A-D
at all before renormalising
no tokens are sampled, so nothing here is random: there is no seed to set, because the sampler's rng never touches the numbers being read.
that is not the same as bit-identical, and the difference is measured. on a
quiet server the same prompt returns the same probabilities every time -- eight
models reproduced their scores exactly across separate runs. on a server under
load, 5 of 16 prompts came back different, by up to 3.2e-02, because
llama.cpp packs concurrent work into shared batches and matmul reduction order
follows batch shape. spec/SPEC.md section 12 carries the tolerance that
implies, and docs/EVALS.md carries the noise floor it puts on every number
measured here.
| jev (hosted) | verdict | |
|---|---|---|
| where it runs | typesafe's api | your hardware, including a phone |
| the model | theirs | any gguf you already have |
| your data | leaves the machine | does not |
| cost | per call | electricity |
| the wire protocol | POST /v1/systemone | the same |
| accuracy | not measured here | measured, docs/EVALS.md |
the trade is real and stated plainly: a hosted service is somebody else's
problem to run and tune, and verdict makes you pick a model and live with what
docs/EVALS.md says about it. a 2.5b model answers in 374 ms, completes a
single-screen android goal 3/3 with no false completions, and fails a goal
that needs navigation 3/3.
a model asked to "reply with only the letter" still generates, still drifts, still needs parsing and retries. reading the logits at one position skips all of that. it is one short request instead of a generation, and the result comes with a health signal a generated answer does not have.
option mass is that signal: the raw probability that landed on the label tokens before renormalising. a model can rank options perfectly on an option mass of 1.7e-08, because renormalising a rounding error still ranks it. accuracy cannot see that; option mass can.
A-Za-z labels 52 options. past that the labels come from the model's own
vocabulary -- single-character letters it already has tokens for, thousands of
them -- so a longer list is still read at one position rather than bracketed
into an approximation. it is opt-in, --wide-alphabet.
it is not free, and what it costs depends on the model. measured with list length held fixed and every label unfamiliar, which is the worst case rather than the shipped one:
| ascii labels | all labels unfamiliar | |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.5-9b | 16/16, mass 0.9996 | 16/16, mass 0.7780 |
| minicpm5-2b | 16/16, mass 0.9995 | 9/16, mass 0.6991 |
| granite-4.2-3b | 15/16, mass 0.9671 | 12/16, mass 0.3754 |
| qwen3.5-2b | 14/16, mass 0.9844 | 12/16, mass 0.3577 |
only the 9b model escapes an accuracy cost. in the configuration actually shipped the pinned 52 come first, so a 104 option list is half familiar and option mass stays at 0.92 to 0.99 on all four.
it also costs latency: an unfamiliar label is not in the top 64 candidates, so the readout has to widen to find it, and the median decision goes from 1033 ms to 2596 ms.
a model that cannot use its own alphabet is refused rather than served. the alphabet is verified the way a formatter is -- by scoring an unambiguous question labelled entirely from it -- and both the option mass and the answer have to hold up. of the four models measured, two are served and two refused, and the two served then pick the right element out of 80.
shortlist if you can; docs/EVALS.md section 2a has the rest, including three
cheaper ways to predict this that were measured and all failed.
spec/ | the contract: prompt layout, question types, result object, golden fixtures |
python/llama_verdict/ | reference client and a jev-compatible server |
demos/ | agent loops driven entirely by typed decisions |
scripts/ | probes, formatter derivation, profiling |
docs/ | measured results and the decisions behind them |
spec/ is the source of truth. the definitive implementation will be rewritten
in rust, so the part that has to survive that is the spec and its fixtures, not
this client.
needs a llama-server or llama-swap with a chat model.
make # validate the spec and fixtures
make test # conformance tests, no model needed
make precommit # lint, build, test
export LLAMA_VERDICT_URL=http://10.1.200.250:7860/v1
export LLAMA_VERDICT_MODEL=qwen3.5-9b:Q8_0
make test-e2e # end to end against the live server
a formatter is the small set of affixes that steer a given model to answer with a bare label. it is derived when a model is first used -- nothing to fit in advance and no per-model artifact to ship. the model's own chat template is rendered with sentinel messages and diffed, the result is checked against the option mass floor, and it is cached by the template's sha256 so it happens once per model rather than once per process.
that matters because a pinned table can only cover models someone thought to pin, which fails the case the library exists for: pointing it at an arbitrary gguf on a device.
# no --formatter: the affixes come from the model's own template
PYTHONPATH=python python3 -m llama_verdict.server \
--base-url "$LLAMA_VERDICT_URL" --model gemma-4-e4b-it:Q8_0 --port 8477
# formatter gemma-4-e4b-it:Q8_0 (mean option mass 1.0000, derived ...)
first derivation costs about 30-50 s, nearly all of it resolving the 52 label
token ids; a cached template is ~300 ms. jinja2 is imported only on that
path, so a cached or pinned model stays stdlib-only.
spec/formatters/ holds four fitted tables and a synthetic reference.json.
those are golden regression fixtures, not the runtime source: conformance
asserts that deriving a pinned model today reproduces its affixes byte for
byte, so a change in the engine, the derivation or the template shows up as a
diff. make formatters refreshes them. a formatter fitted to one model does
not transfer to another -- measured, a mismatched opening puts about 1e-7 of
the mass on the labels.
verdict is an independent project. it is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or derived from typesafe, and jev and system one are their names, not ours.
typesafe's jev is a hosted decision model, called over an http api whose
decision endpoint is POST /v1/systemone. verdict serves that same wire shape,
so an existing jev client changes its base url and nothing else -- no
client code, no field renaming. see docs/JEV_API.md, which records the public
sources it was written from and the date they were read.
the relationship is one-directional and has three parts, worth separating:
| the protocol | a public api surface we implement. /v1/systemone, the choice / score / noul question types, and the response fields clients validate |
| the mechanism | ours. read the probability mass on declared option labels at one token position and renormalise. nothing about how jev works internally is known to us or claimed here |
| the conformance test | browser-use/jev-ultrafast, an unmodified third-party jev client, pointed at verdict with TYPESAFE_BASE_URL. it working is the only real evidence the wire shape is right |
that last one is why the compatibility matters to us at all: a protocol you implement from documentation is a guess until somebody else's client drives it unchanged.
compatibility is a surface, not a claim of equivalence. verdict is a local
readout over a gguf you already have. it makes no claim to match jev's
accuracy, calibration, latency or behaviour, and docs/EVALS.md measures what
it actually does rather than comparing against a hosted service we cannot
inspect.
the server is optional. the python client and the demos talk to it over the same protocol because that keeps one wire format in the project rather than two, and because the rust core is expected to replace this server rather than grow it.
PYTHONPATH=python python3 -m llama_verdict.server \
--base-url "$LLAMA_VERDICT_URL" --model "$LLAMA_VERDICT_MODEL" --port 8477
the demos below all expect it on 127.0.0.1:8477. --formatter is optional
and only pins a table instead of deriving one; --assistant-open spells out an
assistant opening for a format whose generation prompt ends before content
begins, which gpt-oss needs.
agent loops where every decision is a typed question and nothing is generated.
# hacker news, our own cdp driver
./demos/browser_agent.py \
--goal "Read the top 5 comments on each of the top 3 stories on Hacker News." \
--require '[0-9]+\s*comments' \
--collect '^\s*[a-z0-9_-]{2,15} [0-9]+ (?:minute|hour|day)s? ago \|[^\n]*\n+[^\n]+' \
--retire-read
# the same task through an unmodified browser-use/jev-ultrafast client
./demos/run_hn_demo.py --target-first --shortlist 26
# android, over mimic's accessibility surface
./demos/mimic_agent.py --goal "Open About phone and find the Android version." \
--require "Android version" --launch
--require is how a run is SCORED: each pattern must actually appear on a
screen the agent reached. the agent's own DONE is an opinion, and one was
measured at 0.32 with a third of the goal outstanding.
that opinion does carry signal, though. true completions measure 0.862-0.984
and false ones 0.522-0.757, so --done-confidence 0.81 separates them with
room for the drift in section 12 of the spec. run across the three models that
produced false completions, it removed all four and blocked no true one.
it buys trustworthiness rather than capability: the models that could not do
the task still cannot, they now run out of steps instead of claiming success.
it is off by default, and holds a separate threshold from --min-confidence on
purpose -- "is this the right target" and "is the task finished" are different
questions.
--collect is the task's OUTPUT. verdict decides where to look and never
produces the answer text, so whatever the agent navigated to is read off the
page rather than generated. scripts/page_text.py URL dumps exactly what the
agent sees, which is how to write one of these patterns.
docs/EVALS.md is the results document -- every measurement, the
instrument that produced it, and what it does not show. the cheap instruments
come first there for a reason: a benchmark ranks a model in a minute with no
browser and no device, and an agent run against a live site measures the model,
the harness, the network and a page that moves underneath it.
scripts/smoke_models.py --models qwen3.5-4b:Q8_0 minicpm5-2b:Q8_0
docs/DEMOS.md carries the agent-loop narrative and the interventions that did
nothing.
GPL-3.0-or-later. the full text is in LICENSE, verbatim from the fsf.
worth knowing before building on it, because it is a strong copyleft and this
project is heading for a library: REQUIREMENTS.md FR7 describes a flutter
library loading a gguf through llama.cpp via ffi, and the plan's phases 5 and 6
build a dart core and an ffi plugin. under the GPL an application that links
that library must itself be GPL-compatible, which apache-2.0 -- the licence the
plan originally defaulted to -- would not have required. that is a deliberate
choice by the product owner and not an oversight; flagged here so nobody
discovers it at integration time.
THIRD_PARTY.md and the dependency licence check are not written yet. the
python client is stdlib only except jinja2, which is used on the derivation
path alone and is BSD-3-Clause.
calibrated probabilities, out of the box. gemma-4-e2b was measured reporting 1.000 confidence on wrong answers. gating on raw confidence is not safe until a calibration is fitted on your own data, and the docs say which model sizes are fit for which kinds of question rather than implying all of them are.
1 commits
Python
99.2%
turn any llama-server into a jev system one endpoint
Python
3
1 commits
updated Sep 20, 2026
an open source, self-hosted alternative to typesafe's jev and its system one api. verdict serves the same wire protocol on your own hardware, so an existing jev client changes its base url and nothing else.
a small python server sits in front of your existing llama-server or llama-swap endpoint with any model of your choosing and serves a jev compatible API.
answer typed questions about a piece of text without generating any text.
one forward pass, read the probability the model puts on each declared option label, renormalise over them. the answer is a distribution over option ids, with the confidence signals needed to decide whether to act on it.
the shape of it, one question from the hacker news demo:
question: which of these links opens the story's comments?
options: A "229 comments" B "Hacker News" C "hide" D "past"
answer: a distribution over A-D, plus the option mass that landed on A-D
at all before renormalising
no tokens are sampled, so nothing here is random: there is no seed to set, because the sampler's rng never touches the numbers being read.
that is not the same as bit-identical, and the difference is measured. on a
quiet server the same prompt returns the same probabilities every time -- eight
models reproduced their scores exactly across separate runs. on a server under
load, 5 of 16 prompts came back different, by up to 3.2e-02, because
llama.cpp packs concurrent work into shared batches and matmul reduction order
follows batch shape. spec/SPEC.md section 12 carries the tolerance that
implies, and docs/EVALS.md carries the noise floor it puts on every number
measured here.
| jev (hosted) | verdict | |
|---|---|---|
| where it runs | typesafe's api | your hardware, including a phone |
| the model | theirs | any gguf you already have |
| your data | leaves the machine | does not |
| cost | per call | electricity |
| the wire protocol | POST /v1/systemone | the same |
| accuracy | not measured here | measured, docs/EVALS.md |
the trade is real and stated plainly: a hosted service is somebody else's
problem to run and tune, and verdict makes you pick a model and live with what
docs/EVALS.md says about it. a 2.5b model answers in 374 ms, completes a
single-screen android goal 3/3 with no false completions, and fails a goal
that needs navigation 3/3.
a model asked to "reply with only the letter" still generates, still drifts, still needs parsing and retries. reading the logits at one position skips all of that. it is one short request instead of a generation, and the result comes with a health signal a generated answer does not have.
option mass is that signal: the raw probability that landed on the label tokens before renormalising. a model can rank options perfectly on an option mass of 1.7e-08, because renormalising a rounding error still ranks it. accuracy cannot see that; option mass can.
A-Za-z labels 52 options. past that the labels come from the model's own
vocabulary -- single-character letters it already has tokens for, thousands of
them -- so a longer list is still read at one position rather than bracketed
into an approximation. it is opt-in, --wide-alphabet.
it is not free, and what it costs depends on the model. measured with list length held fixed and every label unfamiliar, which is the worst case rather than the shipped one:
| ascii labels | all labels unfamiliar | |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.5-9b | 16/16, mass 0.9996 | 16/16, mass 0.7780 |
| minicpm5-2b | 16/16, mass 0.9995 | 9/16, mass 0.6991 |
| granite-4.2-3b | 15/16, mass 0.9671 | 12/16, mass 0.3754 |
| qwen3.5-2b | 14/16, mass 0.9844 | 12/16, mass 0.3577 |
only the 9b model escapes an accuracy cost. in the configuration actually shipped the pinned 52 come first, so a 104 option list is half familiar and option mass stays at 0.92 to 0.99 on all four.
it also costs latency: an unfamiliar label is not in the top 64 candidates, so the readout has to widen to find it, and the median decision goes from 1033 ms to 2596 ms.
a model that cannot use its own alphabet is refused rather than served. the alphabet is verified the way a formatter is -- by scoring an unambiguous question labelled entirely from it -- and both the option mass and the answer have to hold up. of the four models measured, two are served and two refused, and the two served then pick the right element out of 80.
shortlist if you can; docs/EVALS.md section 2a has the rest, including three
cheaper ways to predict this that were measured and all failed.
spec/ | the contract: prompt layout, question types, result object, golden fixtures |
python/llama_verdict/ | reference client and a jev-compatible server |
demos/ | agent loops driven entirely by typed decisions |
scripts/ | probes, formatter derivation, profiling |
docs/ | measured results and the decisions behind them |
spec/ is the source of truth. the definitive implementation will be rewritten
in rust, so the part that has to survive that is the spec and its fixtures, not
this client.
needs a llama-server or llama-swap with a chat model.
make # validate the spec and fixtures
make test # conformance tests, no model needed
make precommit # lint, build, test
export LLAMA_VERDICT_URL=http://10.1.200.250:7860/v1
export LLAMA_VERDICT_MODEL=qwen3.5-9b:Q8_0
make test-e2e # end to end against the live server
a formatter is the small set of affixes that steer a given model to answer with a bare label. it is derived when a model is first used -- nothing to fit in advance and no per-model artifact to ship. the model's own chat template is rendered with sentinel messages and diffed, the result is checked against the option mass floor, and it is cached by the template's sha256 so it happens once per model rather than once per process.
that matters because a pinned table can only cover models someone thought to pin, which fails the case the library exists for: pointing it at an arbitrary gguf on a device.
# no --formatter: the affixes come from the model's own template
PYTHONPATH=python python3 -m llama_verdict.server \
--base-url "$LLAMA_VERDICT_URL" --model gemma-4-e4b-it:Q8_0 --port 8477
# formatter gemma-4-e4b-it:Q8_0 (mean option mass 1.0000, derived ...)
first derivation costs about 30-50 s, nearly all of it resolving the 52 label
token ids; a cached template is ~300 ms. jinja2 is imported only on that
path, so a cached or pinned model stays stdlib-only.
spec/formatters/ holds four fitted tables and a synthetic reference.json.
those are golden regression fixtures, not the runtime source: conformance
asserts that deriving a pinned model today reproduces its affixes byte for
byte, so a change in the engine, the derivation or the template shows up as a
diff. make formatters refreshes them. a formatter fitted to one model does
not transfer to another -- measured, a mismatched opening puts about 1e-7 of
the mass on the labels.
verdict is an independent project. it is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or derived from typesafe, and jev and system one are their names, not ours.
typesafe's jev is a hosted decision model, called over an http api whose
decision endpoint is POST /v1/systemone. verdict serves that same wire shape,
so an existing jev client changes its base url and nothing else -- no
client code, no field renaming. see docs/JEV_API.md, which records the public
sources it was written from and the date they were read.
the relationship is one-directional and has three parts, worth separating:
| the protocol | a public api surface we implement. /v1/systemone, the choice / score / noul question types, and the response fields clients validate |
| the mechanism | ours. read the probability mass on declared option labels at one token position and renormalise. nothing about how jev works internally is known to us or claimed here |
| the conformance test | browser-use/jev-ultrafast, an unmodified third-party jev client, pointed at verdict with TYPESAFE_BASE_URL. it working is the only real evidence the wire shape is right |
that last one is why the compatibility matters to us at all: a protocol you implement from documentation is a guess until somebody else's client drives it unchanged.
compatibility is a surface, not a claim of equivalence. verdict is a local
readout over a gguf you already have. it makes no claim to match jev's
accuracy, calibration, latency or behaviour, and docs/EVALS.md measures what
it actually does rather than comparing against a hosted service we cannot
inspect.
the server is optional. the python client and the demos talk to it over the same protocol because that keeps one wire format in the project rather than two, and because the rust core is expected to replace this server rather than grow it.
PYTHONPATH=python python3 -m llama_verdict.server \
--base-url "$LLAMA_VERDICT_URL" --model "$LLAMA_VERDICT_MODEL" --port 8477
the demos below all expect it on 127.0.0.1:8477. --formatter is optional
and only pins a table instead of deriving one; --assistant-open spells out an
assistant opening for a format whose generation prompt ends before content
begins, which gpt-oss needs.
agent loops where every decision is a typed question and nothing is generated.
# hacker news, our own cdp driver
./demos/browser_agent.py \
--goal "Read the top 5 comments on each of the top 3 stories on Hacker News." \
--require '[0-9]+\s*comments' \
--collect '^\s*[a-z0-9_-]{2,15} [0-9]+ (?:minute|hour|day)s? ago \|[^\n]*\n+[^\n]+' \
--retire-read
# the same task through an unmodified browser-use/jev-ultrafast client
./demos/run_hn_demo.py --target-first --shortlist 26
# android, over mimic's accessibility surface
./demos/mimic_agent.py --goal "Open About phone and find the Android version." \
--require "Android version" --launch
--require is how a run is SCORED: each pattern must actually appear on a
screen the agent reached. the agent's own DONE is an opinion, and one was
measured at 0.32 with a third of the goal outstanding.
that opinion does carry signal, though. true completions measure 0.862-0.984
and false ones 0.522-0.757, so --done-confidence 0.81 separates them with
room for the drift in section 12 of the spec. run across the three models that
produced false completions, it removed all four and blocked no true one.
it buys trustworthiness rather than capability: the models that could not do
the task still cannot, they now run out of steps instead of claiming success.
it is off by default, and holds a separate threshold from --min-confidence on
purpose -- "is this the right target" and "is the task finished" are different
questions.
--collect is the task's OUTPUT. verdict decides where to look and never
produces the answer text, so whatever the agent navigated to is read off the
page rather than generated. scripts/page_text.py URL dumps exactly what the
agent sees, which is how to write one of these patterns.
docs/EVALS.md is the results document -- every measurement, the
instrument that produced it, and what it does not show. the cheap instruments
come first there for a reason: a benchmark ranks a model in a minute with no
browser and no device, and an agent run against a live site measures the model,
the harness, the network and a page that moves underneath it.
scripts/smoke_models.py --models qwen3.5-4b:Q8_0 minicpm5-2b:Q8_0
docs/DEMOS.md carries the agent-loop narrative and the interventions that did
nothing.
GPL-3.0-or-later. the full text is in LICENSE, verbatim from the fsf.
worth knowing before building on it, because it is a strong copyleft and this
project is heading for a library: REQUIREMENTS.md FR7 describes a flutter
library loading a gguf through llama.cpp via ffi, and the plan's phases 5 and 6
build a dart core and an ffi plugin. under the GPL an application that links
that library must itself be GPL-compatible, which apache-2.0 -- the licence the
plan originally defaulted to -- would not have required. that is a deliberate
choice by the product owner and not an oversight; flagged here so nobody
discovers it at integration time.
THIRD_PARTY.md and the dependency licence check are not written yet. the
python client is stdlib only except jinja2, which is used on the derivation
path alone and is BSD-3-Clause.
calibrated probabilities, out of the box. gemma-4-e2b was measured reporting 1.000 confidence on wrong answers. gating on raw confidence is not safe until a calibration is fitted on your own data, and the docs say which model sizes are fit for which kinds of question rather than implying all of them are.
1 commits
Python
99.2%