🛡️ Local privacy firewall for AI coding agents — masks API keys & personal data before they reach the cloud, then restores them transparently.
Python
5
19 commits
updated Aug 12, 2026
Claude Code and Codex ship your prompts to the cloud — and sometimes your API keys, credit cards and personal data go along for the ride. Exodus masks them before they leave your machine and restores them in the reply, so your tools never notice.
🌐 English (primary) · Español
🧪 Public beta. The local proxy (Part 1) works today — that's exactly what the demo below shows, and what the test suite covers. Running it sealed inside an Intel SGX enclave with verifiable attestation (Part 2) is built and runs in simulation; real-silicon validation is in progress — see
docs/RUN-ON-SGX.md. Bug reports and feedback are very welcome — open an issue.
Real session, no edits: the reply comes back intact — but the cloud only ever saw
⟪EXODUS:anthropic_key:1⟫. Reproduce it yourself from docs/demo/.
Exodus is harm reduction, not invisibility. It does not sell an impossible promise.
sk-ant-…, AKIA…,
JWTs…) and structured PII that validates (credit cards via Luhn, IBAN via mod-97,
DNI/NIE, SSN). A random string with no signature is not detectable as a secret.Full, formal threat model: docs/threat-model.md. Read it before
trusting Exodus with anything.
flowchart LR
subgraph machine["🖥️ Your machine"]
client["Claude Code / Codex<br>*_BASE_URL → localhost"]
exodus["🛡️ Exodus<br>detect → policy → mask"]
vault[("in-memory vault<br>real values never leave")]
end
subgraph cloud["☁️ Cloud"]
api["api.anthropic.com<br>api.openai.com"]
end
client -- "request (plaintext)" --> exodus
exodus -- "request (masked ⟪EXODUS:kind:N⟫)" --> api
api -- "response (masked)" --> exodus
exodus -- "response (restored)" --> client
exodus <-.-> vault
Your client honors a base-URL env var (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, OPENAI_BASE_URL). Point it at
Exodus. Exodus scans each request, replaces detected secrets/PII with reversible placeholders
(⟪EXODUS:kind:N⟫), forwards the cleaned request, and restores the originals in the response.
Diagrams: docs/ARQUITECTURA.md.
Requires Python ≥ 3.11.
git clone <repo-url> exodus && cd exodus
python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e . # core firewall — zero model, zero Ollama
pip install -e ".[local]" # optional: embedded local model (free-text layer)
exodus serve # listens on http://127.0.0.1:8787
In the terminal where you launch Claude Code — export first, then launch:
export ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8787
claude
The WITH EXODUS status indicator means you're protected.
Mode matters: Codex has two authentication modes.
- OAuth login (
codex login) — Codex connects directly to OpenAI with its own tokens;OPENAI_BASE_URLis ignored. Exodus cannot intercept this mode (same design limitation as GUI desktop apps).- API key mode — Codex respects
OPENAI_BASE_URLand routes through Exodus. Requires a key from platform.openai.com/api-keys.
To use Exodus with Codex in API key mode:
# Terminal 1 — start Exodus pointing at OpenAI
EXODUS_UPSTREAM=https://api.openai.com EXODUS_PORT=8788 exodus serve
# Terminal 2 — launch Codex with your platform.openai.com key
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...your-key...
export OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8788/v1
codex
exodus audit # kinds + actions that were masked — never the values
Opt-in debug (full plaintext of your own traffic; off by default, git-ignored):
EXODUS_INSPECT=on exodus serve
Secrets — always masked:
Anthropic · OpenAI (+ sk-proj-) · AWS · Google (API + OAuth) · GitHub (token / PAT / OAuth)
· Slack (token + webhook) · Stripe · SendGrid · npm · JWT · PEM private keys · generic Bearer
· DB connection URIs with credentials.
Structured PII — validated, masked by default: credit cards (Luhn) · IBAN (mod-97) · Spanish DNI / NIE · US SSN.
Lower-sensitivity PII — detected, opt-in: email · IPv4 · international phone.
Free text (names, addresses, sensitive prose — any language) → the optional local model below. Regex can't scale to every country and language; the model is the multilingual answer.
You own the policy: edit src/exodus/policy/policy.example.yaml
to set each kind's action (forward / pseudonymize / block). Fail-closed by default —
an unknown kind is treated as a secret.
A built-in self-test runs a fake sample of every detector kind through the real pipeline and verifies three things: the kind is detected, its value never appears in the outgoing request, and the local vault restores the original bytes exactly.
exodus selftest

Every value is synthetic (documented test tokens, reserved-for-docs identifiers). The same matrix runs in the test suite, so adding a detector without coverage fails the tests.
For sensitive content with no signature, Exodus runs a small model embedded in-process (llama.cpp + a GGUF — no Ollama daemon) to classify and abstract it. Off by default; the core firewall works without it.
pip install -e ".[local]"
EXODUS_LOCAL_MODEL=on exodus serve # downloads a small multilingual model once, then offline
Backend is pluggable: EXODUS_LOCAL_BACKEND=embedded (default) or ollama.
Example — the model strips identifiers, keeps the gist:
in: Patient John Smith, 47, record #55231, 12 Oak St, Madrid, has asthma.
out: Patient has asthma.
Copy .env.example → .env. Key variables:
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
EXODUS_UPSTREAM | provider API to forward to (Anthropic default; https://api.openai.com for Codex) |
EXODUS_HOST / EXODUS_PORT | where Exodus listens (default 127.0.0.1:8787) |
EXODUS_POLICY_FILE | your policy YAML |
EXODUS_LOCAL_MODEL / EXODUS_LOCAL_BACKEND | enable + choose the local-model backend |
EXODUS_INSPECT | debug log of your own traffic (full plaintext; off by default) |
pip install -e ".[dev]" && pytest # 73 passing
The vault can be protected even from the machine's root user by running Exodus inside an SGX enclave via Gramine — no code changes, one manifest:
gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu exodus.manifest.template exodus.manifest
gramine-direct exodus # simulation, any x86_64 Linux
exodus verify --allow-simulated # attestation handshake (nonce → report → verdict)

On SGX hardware the same manifest runs with gramine-sgx and /_exodus/attest returns a
hardware quote; exodus verify --mrenclave <hex> pins the exact build. Details, honest
scope and limits: docs/TEE.md.
Exodus speaks the Model Context Protocol: any MCP client (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, custom agents) can use the firewall as a set of tools.
claude mcp add exodus -- exodus mcp # register with Claude Code
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
exodus_mask | mask secrets/PII in a text before it travels anywhere |
exodus_verify | attestation handshake against a running proxy — can this gateway be trusted? |
exodus_audit | what has been masked so far (kinds and counts, never the values) |
The interesting one is exodus_verify: it gives agents a primitive to check the
privacy gateway before routing secrets through it — nonce freshness, attestation
binding, TLS channel binding and MRENCLAVE pinning, straight from the agent loop
(see docs/TEE.md).
Sensitivity-aware cloud/edge routing is an active research area (PRISM, PrivacyPAD,
Privacy Guard — see paper/references.bib), mostly on generic
prompts. Exodus's contribution is an engineering artifact: an open-source implementation
that brings these ideas to the agentic coding loop (tool-use, file edits, SSE streaming),
with a reversible vault, an honest threat model, and a self-contained local model. See
paper/.
Structure: docs/ESTRUCTURA.md · Roadmap: docs/ROADMAP.md
· Contributing: CONTRIBUTING.md
Apache-2.0 © 2026 Francesco Catania (@sekaibuilder). See LICENSE.
Apache-2.0 is permissive (free for any use, including commercial) and adds an explicit patent
grant — a good fit for security and attestation code.
Exodus is a harm-reduction tool, not a guarantee of anonymity. It reduces the sensitive data that reaches third-party servers; it does not make you invisible. Do not feed it secrets you cannot afford to leak on the assumption that it is infallible.
🛡️ Local privacy firewall for AI coding agents — masks API keys & personal data before they reach the cloud, then restores them transparently.
Python
5
19 commits
updated Aug 12, 2026
Claude Code and Codex ship your prompts to the cloud — and sometimes your API keys, credit cards and personal data go along for the ride. Exodus masks them before they leave your machine and restores them in the reply, so your tools never notice.
🌐 English (primary) · Español
🧪 Public beta. The local proxy (Part 1) works today — that's exactly what the demo below shows, and what the test suite covers. Running it sealed inside an Intel SGX enclave with verifiable attestation (Part 2) is built and runs in simulation; real-silicon validation is in progress — see
docs/RUN-ON-SGX.md. Bug reports and feedback are very welcome — open an issue.
Real session, no edits: the reply comes back intact — but the cloud only ever saw
⟪EXODUS:anthropic_key:1⟫. Reproduce it yourself from docs/demo/.
Exodus is harm reduction, not invisibility. It does not sell an impossible promise.
sk-ant-…, AKIA…,
JWTs…) and structured PII that validates (credit cards via Luhn, IBAN via mod-97,
DNI/NIE, SSN). A random string with no signature is not detectable as a secret.Full, formal threat model: docs/threat-model.md. Read it before
trusting Exodus with anything.
flowchart LR
subgraph machine["🖥️ Your machine"]
client["Claude Code / Codex<br>*_BASE_URL → localhost"]
exodus["🛡️ Exodus<br>detect → policy → mask"]
vault[("in-memory vault<br>real values never leave")]
end
subgraph cloud["☁️ Cloud"]
api["api.anthropic.com<br>api.openai.com"]
end
client -- "request (plaintext)" --> exodus
exodus -- "request (masked ⟪EXODUS:kind:N⟫)" --> api
api -- "response (masked)" --> exodus
exodus -- "response (restored)" --> client
exodus <-.-> vault
Your client honors a base-URL env var (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, OPENAI_BASE_URL). Point it at
Exodus. Exodus scans each request, replaces detected secrets/PII with reversible placeholders
(⟪EXODUS:kind:N⟫), forwards the cleaned request, and restores the originals in the response.
Diagrams: docs/ARQUITECTURA.md.
Requires Python ≥ 3.11.
git clone <repo-url> exodus && cd exodus
python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e . # core firewall — zero model, zero Ollama
pip install -e ".[local]" # optional: embedded local model (free-text layer)
exodus serve # listens on http://127.0.0.1:8787
In the terminal where you launch Claude Code — export first, then launch:
export ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8787
claude
The WITH EXODUS status indicator means you're protected.
Mode matters: Codex has two authentication modes.
- OAuth login (
codex login) — Codex connects directly to OpenAI with its own tokens;OPENAI_BASE_URLis ignored. Exodus cannot intercept this mode (same design limitation as GUI desktop apps).- API key mode — Codex respects
OPENAI_BASE_URLand routes through Exodus. Requires a key from platform.openai.com/api-keys.
To use Exodus with Codex in API key mode:
# Terminal 1 — start Exodus pointing at OpenAI
EXODUS_UPSTREAM=https://api.openai.com EXODUS_PORT=8788 exodus serve
# Terminal 2 — launch Codex with your platform.openai.com key
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...your-key...
export OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8788/v1
codex
exodus audit # kinds + actions that were masked — never the values
Opt-in debug (full plaintext of your own traffic; off by default, git-ignored):
EXODUS_INSPECT=on exodus serve
Secrets — always masked:
Anthropic · OpenAI (+ sk-proj-) · AWS · Google (API + OAuth) · GitHub (token / PAT / OAuth)
· Slack (token + webhook) · Stripe · SendGrid · npm · JWT · PEM private keys · generic Bearer
· DB connection URIs with credentials.
Structured PII — validated, masked by default: credit cards (Luhn) · IBAN (mod-97) · Spanish DNI / NIE · US SSN.
Lower-sensitivity PII — detected, opt-in: email · IPv4 · international phone.
Free text (names, addresses, sensitive prose — any language) → the optional local model below. Regex can't scale to every country and language; the model is the multilingual answer.
You own the policy: edit src/exodus/policy/policy.example.yaml
to set each kind's action (forward / pseudonymize / block). Fail-closed by default —
an unknown kind is treated as a secret.
A built-in self-test runs a fake sample of every detector kind through the real pipeline and verifies three things: the kind is detected, its value never appears in the outgoing request, and the local vault restores the original bytes exactly.
exodus selftest

Every value is synthetic (documented test tokens, reserved-for-docs identifiers). The same matrix runs in the test suite, so adding a detector without coverage fails the tests.
For sensitive content with no signature, Exodus runs a small model embedded in-process (llama.cpp + a GGUF — no Ollama daemon) to classify and abstract it. Off by default; the core firewall works without it.
pip install -e ".[local]"
EXODUS_LOCAL_MODEL=on exodus serve # downloads a small multilingual model once, then offline
Backend is pluggable: EXODUS_LOCAL_BACKEND=embedded (default) or ollama.
Example — the model strips identifiers, keeps the gist:
in: Patient John Smith, 47, record #55231, 12 Oak St, Madrid, has asthma.
out: Patient has asthma.
Copy .env.example → .env. Key variables:
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
EXODUS_UPSTREAM | provider API to forward to (Anthropic default; https://api.openai.com for Codex) |
EXODUS_HOST / EXODUS_PORT | where Exodus listens (default 127.0.0.1:8787) |
EXODUS_POLICY_FILE | your policy YAML |
EXODUS_LOCAL_MODEL / EXODUS_LOCAL_BACKEND | enable + choose the local-model backend |
EXODUS_INSPECT | debug log of your own traffic (full plaintext; off by default) |
pip install -e ".[dev]" && pytest # 73 passing
The vault can be protected even from the machine's root user by running Exodus inside an SGX enclave via Gramine — no code changes, one manifest:
gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu exodus.manifest.template exodus.manifest
gramine-direct exodus # simulation, any x86_64 Linux
exodus verify --allow-simulated # attestation handshake (nonce → report → verdict)

On SGX hardware the same manifest runs with gramine-sgx and /_exodus/attest returns a
hardware quote; exodus verify --mrenclave <hex> pins the exact build. Details, honest
scope and limits: docs/TEE.md.
Exodus speaks the Model Context Protocol: any MCP client (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, custom agents) can use the firewall as a set of tools.
claude mcp add exodus -- exodus mcp # register with Claude Code
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
exodus_mask | mask secrets/PII in a text before it travels anywhere |
exodus_verify | attestation handshake against a running proxy — can this gateway be trusted? |
exodus_audit | what has been masked so far (kinds and counts, never the values) |
The interesting one is exodus_verify: it gives agents a primitive to check the
privacy gateway before routing secrets through it — nonce freshness, attestation
binding, TLS channel binding and MRENCLAVE pinning, straight from the agent loop
(see docs/TEE.md).
Sensitivity-aware cloud/edge routing is an active research area (PRISM, PrivacyPAD,
Privacy Guard — see paper/references.bib), mostly on generic
prompts. Exodus's contribution is an engineering artifact: an open-source implementation
that brings these ideas to the agentic coding loop (tool-use, file edits, SSE streaming),
with a reversible vault, an honest threat model, and a self-contained local model. See
paper/.
Structure: docs/ESTRUCTURA.md · Roadmap: docs/ROADMAP.md
· Contributing: CONTRIBUTING.md
Apache-2.0 © 2026 Francesco Catania (@sekaibuilder). See LICENSE.
Apache-2.0 is permissive (free for any use, including commercial) and adds an explicit patent
grant — a good fit for security and attestation code.
Exodus is a harm-reduction tool, not a guarantee of anonymity. It reduces the sensitive data that reaches third-party servers; it does not make you invisible. Do not feed it secrets you cannot afford to leak on the assumption that it is infallible.