A curated list of AI safety resources: alignment, interpretability, governance, verification, and responsible deployment of frontier AI systems.
See the codeA curated guide to tools, benchmarks and research for evaluating and reducing AI risk. Covers alignment, control, interpretability, application security, formal verification and governance.
Use the evidence at its stated scope. A benchmark score measures sampled behavior. A formal certificate covers an encoded property. A signature authenticates an artifact or statement. None establishes general safety.
Read the website · Curation methodology · October 2026 review · Contribute
| Your task | Start with | Check before drawing a conclusion |
|---|---|---|
| Evaluate a model or agent | Evaluation frameworks | Task coverage, elicitation, scorer validity and contamination. |
| Test prompt injection or harmful requests | Red teaming and agent evaluations | Attack access, tool permissions, benign utility and repeated trials. |
| Study a training intervention | Alignment and control | Baselines, held-out behavior and generalization after further training. |
| Investigate model computation | Interpretability | Supported models, intervention evidence and approximation error. |
| Restrict application behavior | Runtime safeguards and security | Enforcement boundaries and failure behavior. |
| Verify a precise property or artifact | Formal verification and execution evidence | The specification, identity binding and trusted assumptions. |
| Build a risk-management process | Governance and assurance | Applicable context, current official guidance and unresolved risks. |
Reading labels: Research means a reference implementation or experimental method, with no promise of ongoing maintenance. Historical means archived or superseded. Restricted means public access carries additional use or model terms. Other code entries have documented use instructions and an inspected project license; inclusion is not a security audit. Dataset and model terms can differ from code terms.
For an evaluation report, record the threat model, model and harness versions, permissions, budgets, benign utility, scorer validation, failures and uncertainty. See the evaluation checklist.
Training tools implement optimization procedures. Preference fit and refusal behavior alone do not establish robust alignment.
Features and graphs are hypotheses about computation. Validate interpretations with interventions and task-level evidence; a readable feature label does not establish a safety mechanism.
These are bounded research artifacts. Code, data, model weights and underlying assets may have different licenses. Check the exact release before use. Public tests are vulnerable to contamination, judge errors and coverage gaps.
Formal results apply to specified networks, input domains, numerical semantics and properties. They do not verify unrestricted language-model behavior.
A computation proof covers its encoded circuit or program under the proof system's assumptions. Quantization, public/private inputs and model commitments matter. Signed receipts authenticate statements and expose some tampering; check who can observe and attest the underlying event.
Metrics depend on the affected population, decision context and definition of harm. A score alone does not establish sociotechnical fairness.
Years below refer to the first public version. Later revisions may change results. Empirical findings describe their experimental settings; conceptual proposals describe an approach, not demonstrated deployment guarantees.
| Year | Resource | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| 2012 | The Superintelligent Will | Argument for instrumental convergence across many possible final goals. |
| 2015 | Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial AI | Research agenda spanning technical robustness, control and societal impacts. |
| 2016 | Concrete Problems in AI Safety | Side effects, reward hacking, scalable supervision, safe exploration and distributional shift. |
| 2017 | Deep RL from Human Preferences | Learn reward signals from comparisons of agent behavior. |
| 2018 | AI Safety via Debate | Proposal for adversarial debate judged by weaker overseers. |
| 2018 | Scalable Agent Alignment via Reward Modeling | Recursive reward-modeling research agenda for scalable supervision. |
| 2019 | Risks from Learned Optimization | Mesa-optimization and the possibility of objectives differing from the training objective. |
| 2019 | Optimal Policies Tend to Seek Power | Conditional results on power-seeking in Markov decision processes. |
| 2021 | Goal Misgeneralization in Deep RL | Experiments where capabilities generalize while the learned goal does not. |
| 2022 | InstructGPT | Instruction-following language-model training with demonstrations and preference feedback. |
| 2022 | Constitutional AI | Critique and preference training guided by written principles. |
| 2022 | Red Teaming Language Models | Human red-teaming study of language-model failure modes. |
| 2023 | Direct Preference Optimization | Optimize a preference objective directly without training a separate reward model. |
| 2023 | Weak-to-Strong Generalization | Study stronger models trained using weaker model supervision. |
| 2023 | AI Control | Evaluate monitoring and editing protocols against intentionally subversive code generation. |
| 2024 | Debating with More Persuasive LLMs | Weaker judges supervise stronger debaters on information-asymmetric question answering. |
| 2024 | Towards Guaranteed Safe AI | Proposed certificates relative to explicit world models, specifications and verifiers. |
| Year | Resource | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Sleeper Agents | Intentionally backdoored models can retain triggered behavior after the tested safety-training procedures. |
| 2024 | Alignment Faking | Experiments on context-dependent behavior when a model is told about its training process. |
| 2024 | Sycophancy to Subterfuge | Study generalization from specification gaming to reward tampering in constructed environments. |
| 2024 | Unlearning or Obfuscating? | Benign relearning can recover information suppressed by the tested approximate unlearning methods. |
| 2025 | Emergent Misalignment | Broad behavioral changes after narrow insecure-code fine-tuning, with model and context dependence. |
| 2025 | SAEBench | Compare sparse autoencoders across interpretability and application metrics; proxy gains need not improve practical performance. |
| 2026 | AuditBench | Evaluate auditing tools on models with deliberately implanted hidden behaviors. |
| 2026 | Training a Misaligned Reward Seeker | Deliberate training on vulnerable reward environments and bounded tests of subsequent reward-seeking behavior. |
Links lead to primary research feeds or organizational pages. Their inclusion is a route to research, not an endorsement of every claim or policy.
| Group | Research route |
|---|---|
| Anthropic | Alignment, interpretability and model evaluations. |
| Google DeepMind | Responsibility, safety research and evaluation publications. |
| OpenAI | Safety, alignment and preparedness publications. |
| Redwood Research | AI control and evaluation of deceptive behavior. |
| ARC | Theoretical research on explaining model behavior. |
| METR | Evaluations of autonomous model and agent capabilities. |
| Center for AI Safety | Risk research, evaluations and educational resources. |
| FAR AI | Technical AI-safety research and research support. |
| Apollo Research | Evaluating deceptive behavior and related model risks. |
| MIRI | Research and policy work focused on advanced AI risk. |
| UK AI Security Institute | Frontier AI risk and mitigation research. |
| EU AI Office | General-purpose AI oversight and AI Act implementation. |
| NIST | Measurement, standards and risk-management publications. |
Propose a resource or correction through a pull request. Include primary-source evidence, license or access terms, reproduction instructions where applicable, and the gap it fills. See CONTRIBUTING.md and the methodology.
The original descriptions and arrangement of this list are dedicated to the public domain under CC0 1.0. Linked resources retain their own licenses and terms.
A curated list of AI safety resources: alignment, interpretability, governance, verification, and responsible deployment of frontier AI systems.
See the codeA curated guide to tools, benchmarks and research for evaluating and reducing AI risk. Covers alignment, control, interpretability, application security, formal verification and governance.
Use the evidence at its stated scope. A benchmark score measures sampled behavior. A formal certificate covers an encoded property. A signature authenticates an artifact or statement. None establishes general safety.
Read the website · Curation methodology · October 2026 review · Contribute
| Your task | Start with | Check before drawing a conclusion |
|---|---|---|
| Evaluate a model or agent | Evaluation frameworks | Task coverage, elicitation, scorer validity and contamination. |
| Test prompt injection or harmful requests | Red teaming and agent evaluations | Attack access, tool permissions, benign utility and repeated trials. |
| Study a training intervention | Alignment and control | Baselines, held-out behavior and generalization after further training. |
| Investigate model computation | Interpretability | Supported models, intervention evidence and approximation error. |
| Restrict application behavior | Runtime safeguards and security | Enforcement boundaries and failure behavior. |
| Verify a precise property or artifact | Formal verification and execution evidence | The specification, identity binding and trusted assumptions. |
| Build a risk-management process | Governance and assurance | Applicable context, current official guidance and unresolved risks. |
Reading labels: Research means a reference implementation or experimental method, with no promise of ongoing maintenance. Historical means archived or superseded. Restricted means public access carries additional use or model terms. Other code entries have documented use instructions and an inspected project license; inclusion is not a security audit. Dataset and model terms can differ from code terms.
For an evaluation report, record the threat model, model and harness versions, permissions, budgets, benign utility, scorer validation, failures and uncertainty. See the evaluation checklist.
Training tools implement optimization procedures. Preference fit and refusal behavior alone do not establish robust alignment.
Features and graphs are hypotheses about computation. Validate interpretations with interventions and task-level evidence; a readable feature label does not establish a safety mechanism.
These are bounded research artifacts. Code, data, model weights and underlying assets may have different licenses. Check the exact release before use. Public tests are vulnerable to contamination, judge errors and coverage gaps.
Formal results apply to specified networks, input domains, numerical semantics and properties. They do not verify unrestricted language-model behavior.
A computation proof covers its encoded circuit or program under the proof system's assumptions. Quantization, public/private inputs and model commitments matter. Signed receipts authenticate statements and expose some tampering; check who can observe and attest the underlying event.
Metrics depend on the affected population, decision context and definition of harm. A score alone does not establish sociotechnical fairness.
Years below refer to the first public version. Later revisions may change results. Empirical findings describe their experimental settings; conceptual proposals describe an approach, not demonstrated deployment guarantees.
| Year | Resource | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| 2012 | The Superintelligent Will | Argument for instrumental convergence across many possible final goals. |
| 2015 | Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial AI | Research agenda spanning technical robustness, control and societal impacts. |
| 2016 | Concrete Problems in AI Safety | Side effects, reward hacking, scalable supervision, safe exploration and distributional shift. |
| 2017 | Deep RL from Human Preferences | Learn reward signals from comparisons of agent behavior. |
| 2018 | AI Safety via Debate | Proposal for adversarial debate judged by weaker overseers. |
| 2018 | Scalable Agent Alignment via Reward Modeling | Recursive reward-modeling research agenda for scalable supervision. |
| 2019 | Risks from Learned Optimization | Mesa-optimization and the possibility of objectives differing from the training objective. |
| 2019 | Optimal Policies Tend to Seek Power | Conditional results on power-seeking in Markov decision processes. |
| 2021 | Goal Misgeneralization in Deep RL | Experiments where capabilities generalize while the learned goal does not. |
| 2022 | InstructGPT | Instruction-following language-model training with demonstrations and preference feedback. |
| 2022 | Constitutional AI | Critique and preference training guided by written principles. |
| 2022 | Red Teaming Language Models | Human red-teaming study of language-model failure modes. |
| 2023 | Direct Preference Optimization | Optimize a preference objective directly without training a separate reward model. |
| 2023 | Weak-to-Strong Generalization | Study stronger models trained using weaker model supervision. |
| 2023 | AI Control | Evaluate monitoring and editing protocols against intentionally subversive code generation. |
| 2024 | Debating with More Persuasive LLMs | Weaker judges supervise stronger debaters on information-asymmetric question answering. |
| 2024 | Towards Guaranteed Safe AI | Proposed certificates relative to explicit world models, specifications and verifiers. |
| Year | Resource | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Sleeper Agents | Intentionally backdoored models can retain triggered behavior after the tested safety-training procedures. |
| 2024 | Alignment Faking | Experiments on context-dependent behavior when a model is told about its training process. |
| 2024 | Sycophancy to Subterfuge | Study generalization from specification gaming to reward tampering in constructed environments. |
| 2024 | Unlearning or Obfuscating? | Benign relearning can recover information suppressed by the tested approximate unlearning methods. |
| 2025 | Emergent Misalignment | Broad behavioral changes after narrow insecure-code fine-tuning, with model and context dependence. |
| 2025 | SAEBench | Compare sparse autoencoders across interpretability and application metrics; proxy gains need not improve practical performance. |
| 2026 | AuditBench | Evaluate auditing tools on models with deliberately implanted hidden behaviors. |
| 2026 | Training a Misaligned Reward Seeker | Deliberate training on vulnerable reward environments and bounded tests of subsequent reward-seeking behavior. |
Links lead to primary research feeds or organizational pages. Their inclusion is a route to research, not an endorsement of every claim or policy.
| Group | Research route |
|---|---|
| Anthropic | Alignment, interpretability and model evaluations. |
| Google DeepMind | Responsibility, safety research and evaluation publications. |
| OpenAI | Safety, alignment and preparedness publications. |
| Redwood Research | AI control and evaluation of deceptive behavior. |
| ARC | Theoretical research on explaining model behavior. |
| METR | Evaluations of autonomous model and agent capabilities. |
| Center for AI Safety | Risk research, evaluations and educational resources. |
| FAR AI | Technical AI-safety research and research support. |
| Apollo Research | Evaluating deceptive behavior and related model risks. |
| MIRI | Research and policy work focused on advanced AI risk. |
| UK AI Security Institute | Frontier AI risk and mitigation research. |
| EU AI Office | General-purpose AI oversight and AI Act implementation. |
| NIST | Measurement, standards and risk-management publications. |
Propose a resource or correction through a pull request. Include primary-source evidence, license or access terms, reproduction instructions where applicable, and the gap it fills. See CONTRIBUTING.md and the methodology.
The original descriptions and arrangement of this list are dedicated to the public domain under CC0 1.0. Linked resources retain their own licenses and terms.