Curated resources, research, and tools for securing AI systems
See the codeCurated resources, research, and tools for securing AI systems. Managed by AISecHub. Powered by: InnovGuard
Technology Risk & Cybersecurity Advisory - Innovate with Confidence, Lead with Assurance.
Schedule a meeting
OWASP
DoD CIO - AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide (2025) - Practical RMF tailoring for AI systems across the lifecycle; complements CDAO’s RAI toolkit.
NCSC (UK) - Guidelines for Secure AI System Development - End-to-end secure AI SDLC (secure design, development, deployment, and secure operation & maintenance), including logging/monitoring and update management.
SANS – Critical AI Security Guidelines - Control-focused guidance for securing AI/LLM systems across six domains (e.g., access controls, data protection, inference security, monitoring, GRC).
BSI – Security of AI Systems: Fundamentals - Sector-agnostic fundamentals: lifecycle threat model (data/model/pipeline/runtime), adversarial ML attacks (poisoning, evasion, inversion, extraction, backdoors), and baseline controls for design→deploy→operate, plus assurance/certification guidance.
MITRE – SAFE-AI: A Framework for Securing AI-Enabled Systems - Threat-informed RMF overlay for AI: maps AI/ATLAS tactics to NIST SP 800-53 controls, lists ~100 AI-affected controls, and includes assessor interview Q&A sets to plan SCAs.
NIST - SP 800-218A: Secure Software Development Practices for Generative AI & Dual-Use Foundation Models (SSDF Community Profile) - Community profile of NIST’s SSDF tailored to generative AI and dual-use foundation models; adds AI-specific tasks across the lifecycle (data/model provenance, evaluation & red teaming, supply chain assurance, incident response).
NSA - Artificial Intelligence Security Center (AISC)
FS-ISAC - Framework of an Acceptable Use Policy for External Generative AI - framework-style guidance (not a template) with permissive vs. stringent clause options for inputs/outputs, access control, monitoring, and representation. PDF
Org-facing, ready-to-adapt/adjust policies for secure, responsible AI (e.g., acceptable use, data classification & handling, privacy/PII & retention, model/tool approvals, human-in-the-loop, attribution & content provenance, evaluation/red teaming, incident response, and third-party/vendor risk).
Practical workbooks and self-assessments to baseline AI risk, evaluate third parties, and plan improvements.
Use with: DoD CIO - AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide (2025) - the CIO guide says to accompany the CDAO RAI Toolkit.
Inclusion criteria (open-source tools): must have 220+ GitHub stars, active maintenance in the last 12 months, and ≥3 contributors.
Prevent credential exfiltration by ensuring AI agents never access raw API keys; inject secrets at request time via proxy gateways.
Detect and stop prompt-injection (direct/indirect) across inputs, context, and outputs; filter hostile content before it reaches tools or models.
Enforce safety policies and block jailbreaks at runtime via rules/validators/DSLs, with optional human-in-the-loop for sensitive actions.
Analyze serialized model files for unsafe deserialization and embedded code; verify integrity/metadata and block or quarantine on fail.
Black-box fingerprinting to identify the underlying LLM/version behind an application or API and to support provenance verification, useful for model discovery, access control (allowlists), vendor due diligence, incident response, and audits.
LLM-assisted decompilation and reconstruction for security analysis (malware triage, DFIR, vuln research).
Scan/audit MCP servers & client configs; detect tool poisoning, unsafe flows; constrain tool access with least-privilege and audit trails.
Run untrusted or LLM-triggered code in isolated sandboxes (FS/network/process limits) to contain RCE and reduce blast radius.
E2B - SDK + self-hostable infra to run untrusted, LLM-generated code in isolated cloud sandboxes (Firecracker microVMs).
microsandbox - self-hosted microVM (libkrun) sandbox for untrusted AI/user code.
Run AI models inside attested TEEs with end-to-end encryption, auditability, and unlinkable requests so prompts and outputs never leave the secure boundary.
Centralize auth, quotas/rate limits, cost caps, egress/DLP filters, and guardrail orchestration across all model/providers.
Automate attack suites (prompt-injection, leakage, jailbreak, goal-based tasks) in CI; score results and produce regression evidence.
Generate and verify AI/ML BOMs, signatures, and provenance for models/datasets/dependencies; enforce allow/deny policies.
Harden RAG memory: isolate namespaces, sanitize queries/content, detect poisoning/outliers, and prevent secret/PII retention.
Detect and mitigate dataset/model poisoning and backdoors; validate training/fine-tuning integrity and prune suspicious behaviors.
Prevent secret/PII exfiltration in prompts/outputs via detection, redaction, and policy checks at I/O boundaries.
Collect AI-specific security logs/signals; detect abuse patterns (PI/jailbreak/leakage), enrich alerts, and support forensics.
LangKit - LLM observability metrics toolkit (whylogs-compatible): prompt-injection/jailbreak similarity, PII patterns, hallucination/consistency, relevance, sentiment/toxicity, readability.
Alibi Detect - Production drift/outlier/adversarial detection for tabular, text, images, and time series; online/offline detectors with TF/PyTorch backends; returns scores, thresholds, and flags for alerting.
Matrix-style resources covering adversarial TTPs and curated defensive techniques for AI systems.
Guidance and standards for securing the AI/ML software supply chain (models, datasets, code, pipelines). Primarily specs and frameworks; includes vetted TPRM templates.
Normative formats and specifications for transparency and traceability across AI components and dependencies.
Questionnaires and templates to assess external vendors, model providers, and integrators for security, privacy, and compliance.
Monthly curated playlists of AI-security talks, demos, incidents, and tooling.
Interactive CTFs and self-contained labs for hands-on security skills (web, pwn, crypto, forensics, reversing). Used to assess practical reasoning, tool use, and end-to-end task execution.
Phishing dataset gap: there isn’t a public corpus that, per page, stores the URL plus full HTML/CSS/JS, images, favicon, and a screenshot. Most sources are just URL feeds; pages vanish quickly; older benchmarks drift, so models don’t generalize well. Collect a per-URL archive of all page resources, with caveats that screenshots are viewport-only and some assets may be blocked by browser safety.
Structured Q&A datasets assessing security knowledge and terminology. Used to evaluate factual recall and conceptual understanding.
CyberMetric - 10k MCQs via RAG from standards/books/RFCs; subsets (80/500/2k/10k).
SecEval
- ~2k MCQs across 9 domains; eval kit and leaderboard on GitHub.
AttackQA - 25,335 SOC/MITRE ATT&CK-grounded Q&A with rationales.
SECQA - 242 MCQs (v1: 127, v2: 115), GPT-4–generated from one textbook; good for quick probes.
Code snippet datasets labeled as vulnerable or secure, often tied to CWEs (Common Weakness Enumeration). Used to evaluate the model’s ability to recognize insecure code patterns and suggest secure fixes.
Py150k - ≈150k Python files from GitHub (deduped/fork-removed); Static analysis with Bandit, Semgrep, Snyk identified 42,753 vulnerabilities across 26,147 snippets; common CWEs: XSS (18%), SQLi (15%), Improper Input Validation (12%), OS Command Injection (10%), Information Exposure (8%). Collected from GitHub with dedup/fork removal, only parsable code (AST checks, ≤30k nodes), and permissive licenses. Used for: training and fine-tuning (e.g., CodeGen, CodeGen2/2.5, CodeLlama, CrystalCoder, CodeT5+).
PrimeVul – Combines BigVul, CrossVul, CVEfixes, and DiverseVul; de-duplicated and commit-filtered for high-quality labels; temporal train/val/test split by commit time. 224,533 functions from 755 open-source projects; 6,062 vulnerable; broad CWE coverage. (arXiv)
CredData (Samsung) - Labeled dataset of credential-like code lines flagged by scanners, with human GroundTruth (T/F/X) + metadata for benchmarking secret scanners.
sha256, family, type (banker, trojan, pws, coinminer, rat, keylogger), detection date. Two versions: Full (~13 GB) and Reduced (~566 MB) keeping behavior.summary + static.pe (avoids label leakage). Used for: behavior-based malware classification & concept-drift studies. - arXivbona-fide / spoofed. arXivbona-fide + 17.2 h spoofed, scraped from social/video platforms. Labels: bona-fide / spoofed. arXivbona-fide (M-AILABS) / spoof (MLAAD). arXivbona-fide / fully-spoofed / partially-spoofed. arXivfor-original, for-norm, for-2sec, for-rerec. Labels: real / synthetic.real / codec-generated fake. arXivAdversarial prompt datasets-both text-only and multimodal-designed to bypass safety mechanisms or test refusal logic. Used to test how effectively a model resists jailbreaks and enforces policy-based refusal.
Public prompt-injection datasets have recurring limitations: partial staleness as models and defenses evolve, CTF skew toward basic instruction following, and label mixing across toxicity, jailbreak roleplay, and true injections that inflates measured true positive rates and distorts evaluation.
jailbreak / benign for robustness evals.train split; CSV/Parquet.train/test) for training baselines and detectors.train 50k / test 10k); 3-way labels: benign 0, injection 1, harmful request 2; Parquet.Collections of leaked, official, and synthetic system prompts and paired responses used to study guardrails and spot system prompt exposure. Used to build leakage detectors, craft targeted guardrail tests (consent gates, tool use rules, safety policies), and reproduce vendor behaviors for evaluation.
📌 (More working groups to be added.)
Purpose: Evaluates the correctness and security of model-generated code in realistic, production-like settings.
Purpose: Evaluates agent performance on offensive-security tasks (pentesting, exploitation, and misuse resistance) with containerized runners and reproducible scoring. NIST AI RMF Alignment: Measure, Manage
Used for: evaluating agents on exploit generation and patch-validated vulnerability triggering across four subtypes with containerized runners and pass/fail scoring.
Used for: time-boxed flag-capture tasks that isolate skills (web/pwn/rev/crypto/etc.) with containerized scoring.
Used for: full host compromise across recon→exploit→privesc on realistic VMs with scripted scoring.
Used for: targeted exploit generation/execution against apps with known CVEs; measures live-system interaction.
Used for: PoC inputs that crash the vulnerable build and not the patched build under fixed time/memory; sanitizer oracle.
AgentHarm human-authored harmful agent tasks for tool-using agents with benign counterparts, synthetic proxy tools, and a reproducible scoring harness; 110 base tasks (440 with augmentation), 11 categories, 104 tools. arXiv • Best for: measuring refusal vs completion on multi-step tool use and the impact of jailbreaks.
Purple Llama – CyberSecEval - evaluates models’ propensity to assist cyber-offense (exploit/malware) and to generate insecure code; graded-risk tasks with a reproducible harness. Best for: dangerous-capability / misuse-risk scoring (text/IDE, non-agent).
Purpose: Evaluates resistance to prompt-injection and jailbreak attempts in chat/RAG/agent contexts.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Measure, Manage
Lakera PINT Benchmark Prompt-injection benchmark with a curated multilingual test suite, explicit categories (injections, jailbreaks, hard negatives, benign chats/docs), and a reproducible scoring harness (PINT score + notebooks) for fair detector comparison and regression tracking.
JailbreakBench standardized jailbreak prompts + scoring harness; measures refusal/compliance and jailbreak success across models and settings.
Purpose: Assesses AI models for unauthorized modifications, including backdoors and dataset poisoning. Supports trustworthiness and security of model outputs.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Map, Measure
Purpose: Ensures AI security aligns with governance frameworks, industry regulations, and security policies. Supports auditability and risk management.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Govern
Purpose: Evaluates AI for risks like data leakage, membership inference, and model inversion. Helps ensure privacy preservation and compliance.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Measure, Manage
Purpose: Assesses AI for transparency, fairness, and bias mitigation. Ensures AI operates in an interpretable and ethical manner.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Govern, Map, Measure
Vulnerabilities disclosed in the last 12 months. Related attack patterns, campaigns, malware, and research items are listed separately below.
Flaws or exploit chains in products, frameworks, features, or workflows that can be directly abused by an attacker.
| Name | Description | Source | Disclosure date | CVE(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EchoLeak | A zero-click Microsoft 365 Copilot vulnerability that can exfiltrate sensitive data from Copilot context. | Aim Security | 2025-05-31 | CVE-2025-32711 |
| CurXecute | A Cursor vulnerability that can lead to remote code execution by writing MCP-sensitive files such as .cursor/mcp.json. | GitHub Advisory | 2025-08-02 | CVE-2025-54135 |
| MCPoison | A Cursor vulnerability where trusted MCP configurations can be modified without re-approval, enabling persistent code execution. | Check Point Research | 2025-08-01 | CVE-2025-54136 |
| LangGrinch | A langchain-core serialization injection flaw that can expose secrets and enable unsafe object instantiation. | Cyata | 2025-12-23 | CVE-2025-68664 |
| BodySnatcher | A ServiceNow AI Platform vulnerability that allows unauthenticated user impersonation through Virtual Agent and Now Assist flows. | AppOmni | 2026-01-13 | CVE-2025-12420 |
| Reprompt | A single-click Copilot Personal exploit that abuses crafted URL parameters to exfiltrate data. | Varonis Threat Labs | 2026-01-15 | — |
| Clinejection | A prompt injection and GitHub Actions cache-poisoning chain that could steal publish tokens and compromise releases. | Adnan Khan | 2026-02-09 | — |
| RoguePilot | A GitHub Codespaces and Copilot exploit chain that can steal GITHUB_TOKEN and enable repository takeover. | Orca Security | 2026-02-16 | — |
| Claudy Day | A Claude.ai exploit chain using invisible prompt injection, Files API abuse, and open redirects to exfiltrate chat history. | Oasis Security | 2026-03-18 | — |
Methods, techniques, or recurring abuse models that describe how attackers achieve their goals across one or more systems.
| Name | Description | Source | Disclosure date | CVE(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HashJack | An indirect prompt injection technique that hides malicious instructions inside the URL fragment. | Cato CTRL | 2025-11-25 | — |
| LegalPwn | A prompt injection technique that disguises malicious instructions as legal or compliance text. | Pangea Labs | 2025-07-30 | — |
| AIKatz | A post-compromise technique that steals tokens and session artifacts from desktop LLM apps. | Lumia Security Labs | 2025-11-12 | — |
| Tool Poisoning Attack | An MCP attack pattern where malicious instructions are hidden in tool descriptions visible to the model. | Invariant | 2025-04-01 | — |
| MCP Rug Pull | An MCP pattern where a trusted tool or server changes after approval and becomes malicious. | Invariant | 2025-04-01 | — |
| Cross-Origin Escalation | An MCP pattern where one malicious server influences or redirects trusted tools on another server. | Invariant | 2025-04-11 | — |
| ShadowMQ | A recurring pattern where unsafe ZeroMQ plus pickle deserialization spreads RCE risk across AI systems through code reuse. | Oligo Security | 2025-11-13 | — |
| Living Off AI | A pattern where untrusted external input is later executed inside privileged internal AI workflows. | Cato CTRL | 2025-06-19 | — |
Clusters of malicious activity or operations observed over time against specific targets.
| Name | Description | Source | Disclosure date | CVE(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operation Bizarre Bazaar | An LLMjacking campaign focused on scanning, validating, and monetizing exposed LLM and MCP infrastructure. | Pillar Security | 2026-01-28 | — |
| ShadowRay 2.0 | A follow-on ShadowRay campaign that turned exposed Ray clusters into cryptojacking and botnet-style operations. | Oligo Security | 2025-11 | CVE-2023-48022 |
| ClawHavoc | A supply chain campaign distributing malicious ClawHub and OpenClaw skills through fake prerequisites and external payloads. | Koi Research | 2026-02-01 | — |
Backdoors, implants, or malicious programs used to execute or support attacks.
| Name | Description | Source | Disclosure date | CVE(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SesameOp | A backdoor that abuses the OpenAI Assistants API as a command-and-control channel. | Microsoft Incident Response | 2025-11-03 | — |
📌 (More to be added - A collection of AI security reports, white papers, and academic studies.)
(Core references and syntheses for orientation and shared language.)
(Authoritative definitions for AI/ML security, governance, and risk-use to align terminology across docs and reviews.)
(Systematizations of Knowledge (SoK), surveys, systematic reviews, and mapping studies.)
(Reusable classification schemes-clear dimensions, categories, and labeling rules for attacks, defenses, datasets, and risks.)
Curated market maps of tools and vendors for securing LLM and agentic AI applications across the lifecycle.
| Acronym | Full Form |
|---|---|
| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
| AGI | Artificial General Intelligence |
| ALBERT | A Lite BERT |
| AOC | Area Over Curve |
| ASR | Attack Success Rate |
| BERT | Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers |
| BGMAttack | Black-box Generative Model-based Attack |
| CBA | Composite Backdoor Attack |
| CCPA | California Consumer Privacy Act |
| CNN | Convolutional Neural Network |
| CoT | Chain-of-Thought |
| DAN | Do Anything Now |
| DFS | Depth-First Search |
| DNN | Deep Neural Network |
| DPO | Direct Preference Optimization |
| DP | Differential Privacy |
| FL | Federated Learning |
| GA | Genetic Algorithm |
| GDPR | General Data Protection Regulation |
| GPT | Generative Pre-trained Transformer |
| GRPO | Group Relative Policy Optimization |
| HIPAA | Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act |
| ICL | In-Context Learning |
| KL | Kullback-Leibler Divergence |
| LAS | Leakage-Adjusted Simulatability |
| LM | Language Model |
| LLM | Large Language Model |
| Llama | Large Language Model Meta AI |
| LoRA | Low-Rank Adapter |
| LRM | Large Reasoning Model |
| MCTS | Monte-Carlo Tree Search |
| MIA | Membership Inference Attack |
| MCP | Modern Context Protocol |
| MDP | Masking-Differential Prompting |
| MLM | Masked Language Model |
| MLLM | Multimodal Large Language Model |
| MLRM | Multimodal Large Reasoning Model |
| MoE | Mixture-of-Experts |
| NLP | Natural Language Processing |
| OOD | Out Of Distribution |
| ORM | Outcome Reward Model |
| PI | Prompt Injection |
| PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
| PAIR | Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement |
| PLM | pre-trained Language Model |
| PRM | Process Reward Model |
| QA | Question-Answering |
| RAG | Retrieval-Augmented Generation |
| RL | Reinforcement Learning |
| RLHF | Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback |
| RLVR | Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Reward |
| RoBERTa | Robustly optimized BERT approach |
| SCM | Structural Causal Model |
| SGD | Stochastic Gradient Descent |
| SOTA | State of the Art |
| TAG | Gradient Attack on Transformer-based Language Models |
| VR | Verifiable Reward |
| XLNet | Transformer-XL with autoregressive and autoencoding pre-training |
Contributions are welcome! If you have new resources, tools, or insights to add, feel free to submit a pull request.
This repository follows the Awesome Manifesto guidelines.
© 2025 Tal Eliyahu. Licensed under the MIT License. See LICENSE.
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Curated resources, research, and tools for securing AI systems
See the codeCurated resources, research, and tools for securing AI systems. Managed by AISecHub. Powered by: InnovGuard
Technology Risk & Cybersecurity Advisory - Innovate with Confidence, Lead with Assurance.
Schedule a meeting
OWASP
DoD CIO - AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide (2025) - Practical RMF tailoring for AI systems across the lifecycle; complements CDAO’s RAI toolkit.
NCSC (UK) - Guidelines for Secure AI System Development - End-to-end secure AI SDLC (secure design, development, deployment, and secure operation & maintenance), including logging/monitoring and update management.
SANS – Critical AI Security Guidelines - Control-focused guidance for securing AI/LLM systems across six domains (e.g., access controls, data protection, inference security, monitoring, GRC).
BSI – Security of AI Systems: Fundamentals - Sector-agnostic fundamentals: lifecycle threat model (data/model/pipeline/runtime), adversarial ML attacks (poisoning, evasion, inversion, extraction, backdoors), and baseline controls for design→deploy→operate, plus assurance/certification guidance.
MITRE – SAFE-AI: A Framework for Securing AI-Enabled Systems - Threat-informed RMF overlay for AI: maps AI/ATLAS tactics to NIST SP 800-53 controls, lists ~100 AI-affected controls, and includes assessor interview Q&A sets to plan SCAs.
NIST - SP 800-218A: Secure Software Development Practices for Generative AI & Dual-Use Foundation Models (SSDF Community Profile) - Community profile of NIST’s SSDF tailored to generative AI and dual-use foundation models; adds AI-specific tasks across the lifecycle (data/model provenance, evaluation & red teaming, supply chain assurance, incident response).
NSA - Artificial Intelligence Security Center (AISC)
FS-ISAC - Framework of an Acceptable Use Policy for External Generative AI - framework-style guidance (not a template) with permissive vs. stringent clause options for inputs/outputs, access control, monitoring, and representation. PDF
Org-facing, ready-to-adapt/adjust policies for secure, responsible AI (e.g., acceptable use, data classification & handling, privacy/PII & retention, model/tool approvals, human-in-the-loop, attribution & content provenance, evaluation/red teaming, incident response, and third-party/vendor risk).
Practical workbooks and self-assessments to baseline AI risk, evaluate third parties, and plan improvements.
Use with: DoD CIO - AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide (2025) - the CIO guide says to accompany the CDAO RAI Toolkit.
Inclusion criteria (open-source tools): must have 220+ GitHub stars, active maintenance in the last 12 months, and ≥3 contributors.
Prevent credential exfiltration by ensuring AI agents never access raw API keys; inject secrets at request time via proxy gateways.
Detect and stop prompt-injection (direct/indirect) across inputs, context, and outputs; filter hostile content before it reaches tools or models.
Enforce safety policies and block jailbreaks at runtime via rules/validators/DSLs, with optional human-in-the-loop for sensitive actions.
Analyze serialized model files for unsafe deserialization and embedded code; verify integrity/metadata and block or quarantine on fail.
Black-box fingerprinting to identify the underlying LLM/version behind an application or API and to support provenance verification, useful for model discovery, access control (allowlists), vendor due diligence, incident response, and audits.
LLM-assisted decompilation and reconstruction for security analysis (malware triage, DFIR, vuln research).
Scan/audit MCP servers & client configs; detect tool poisoning, unsafe flows; constrain tool access with least-privilege and audit trails.
Run untrusted or LLM-triggered code in isolated sandboxes (FS/network/process limits) to contain RCE and reduce blast radius.
E2B - SDK + self-hostable infra to run untrusted, LLM-generated code in isolated cloud sandboxes (Firecracker microVMs).
microsandbox - self-hosted microVM (libkrun) sandbox for untrusted AI/user code.
Run AI models inside attested TEEs with end-to-end encryption, auditability, and unlinkable requests so prompts and outputs never leave the secure boundary.
Centralize auth, quotas/rate limits, cost caps, egress/DLP filters, and guardrail orchestration across all model/providers.
Automate attack suites (prompt-injection, leakage, jailbreak, goal-based tasks) in CI; score results and produce regression evidence.
Generate and verify AI/ML BOMs, signatures, and provenance for models/datasets/dependencies; enforce allow/deny policies.
Harden RAG memory: isolate namespaces, sanitize queries/content, detect poisoning/outliers, and prevent secret/PII retention.
Detect and mitigate dataset/model poisoning and backdoors; validate training/fine-tuning integrity and prune suspicious behaviors.
Prevent secret/PII exfiltration in prompts/outputs via detection, redaction, and policy checks at I/O boundaries.
Collect AI-specific security logs/signals; detect abuse patterns (PI/jailbreak/leakage), enrich alerts, and support forensics.
LangKit - LLM observability metrics toolkit (whylogs-compatible): prompt-injection/jailbreak similarity, PII patterns, hallucination/consistency, relevance, sentiment/toxicity, readability.
Alibi Detect - Production drift/outlier/adversarial detection for tabular, text, images, and time series; online/offline detectors with TF/PyTorch backends; returns scores, thresholds, and flags for alerting.
Matrix-style resources covering adversarial TTPs and curated defensive techniques for AI systems.
Guidance and standards for securing the AI/ML software supply chain (models, datasets, code, pipelines). Primarily specs and frameworks; includes vetted TPRM templates.
Normative formats and specifications for transparency and traceability across AI components and dependencies.
Questionnaires and templates to assess external vendors, model providers, and integrators for security, privacy, and compliance.
Monthly curated playlists of AI-security talks, demos, incidents, and tooling.
Interactive CTFs and self-contained labs for hands-on security skills (web, pwn, crypto, forensics, reversing). Used to assess practical reasoning, tool use, and end-to-end task execution.
Phishing dataset gap: there isn’t a public corpus that, per page, stores the URL plus full HTML/CSS/JS, images, favicon, and a screenshot. Most sources are just URL feeds; pages vanish quickly; older benchmarks drift, so models don’t generalize well. Collect a per-URL archive of all page resources, with caveats that screenshots are viewport-only and some assets may be blocked by browser safety.
Structured Q&A datasets assessing security knowledge and terminology. Used to evaluate factual recall and conceptual understanding.
CyberMetric - 10k MCQs via RAG from standards/books/RFCs; subsets (80/500/2k/10k).
SecEval
- ~2k MCQs across 9 domains; eval kit and leaderboard on GitHub.
AttackQA - 25,335 SOC/MITRE ATT&CK-grounded Q&A with rationales.
SECQA - 242 MCQs (v1: 127, v2: 115), GPT-4–generated from one textbook; good for quick probes.
Code snippet datasets labeled as vulnerable or secure, often tied to CWEs (Common Weakness Enumeration). Used to evaluate the model’s ability to recognize insecure code patterns and suggest secure fixes.
Py150k - ≈150k Python files from GitHub (deduped/fork-removed); Static analysis with Bandit, Semgrep, Snyk identified 42,753 vulnerabilities across 26,147 snippets; common CWEs: XSS (18%), SQLi (15%), Improper Input Validation (12%), OS Command Injection (10%), Information Exposure (8%). Collected from GitHub with dedup/fork removal, only parsable code (AST checks, ≤30k nodes), and permissive licenses. Used for: training and fine-tuning (e.g., CodeGen, CodeGen2/2.5, CodeLlama, CrystalCoder, CodeT5+).
PrimeVul – Combines BigVul, CrossVul, CVEfixes, and DiverseVul; de-duplicated and commit-filtered for high-quality labels; temporal train/val/test split by commit time. 224,533 functions from 755 open-source projects; 6,062 vulnerable; broad CWE coverage. (arXiv)
CredData (Samsung) - Labeled dataset of credential-like code lines flagged by scanners, with human GroundTruth (T/F/X) + metadata for benchmarking secret scanners.
sha256, family, type (banker, trojan, pws, coinminer, rat, keylogger), detection date. Two versions: Full (~13 GB) and Reduced (~566 MB) keeping behavior.summary + static.pe (avoids label leakage). Used for: behavior-based malware classification & concept-drift studies. - arXivbona-fide / spoofed. arXivbona-fide + 17.2 h spoofed, scraped from social/video platforms. Labels: bona-fide / spoofed. arXivbona-fide (M-AILABS) / spoof (MLAAD). arXivbona-fide / fully-spoofed / partially-spoofed. arXivfor-original, for-norm, for-2sec, for-rerec. Labels: real / synthetic.real / codec-generated fake. arXivAdversarial prompt datasets-both text-only and multimodal-designed to bypass safety mechanisms or test refusal logic. Used to test how effectively a model resists jailbreaks and enforces policy-based refusal.
Public prompt-injection datasets have recurring limitations: partial staleness as models and defenses evolve, CTF skew toward basic instruction following, and label mixing across toxicity, jailbreak roleplay, and true injections that inflates measured true positive rates and distorts evaluation.
jailbreak / benign for robustness evals.train split; CSV/Parquet.train/test) for training baselines and detectors.train 50k / test 10k); 3-way labels: benign 0, injection 1, harmful request 2; Parquet.Collections of leaked, official, and synthetic system prompts and paired responses used to study guardrails and spot system prompt exposure. Used to build leakage detectors, craft targeted guardrail tests (consent gates, tool use rules, safety policies), and reproduce vendor behaviors for evaluation.
📌 (More working groups to be added.)
Purpose: Evaluates the correctness and security of model-generated code in realistic, production-like settings.
Purpose: Evaluates agent performance on offensive-security tasks (pentesting, exploitation, and misuse resistance) with containerized runners and reproducible scoring. NIST AI RMF Alignment: Measure, Manage
Used for: evaluating agents on exploit generation and patch-validated vulnerability triggering across four subtypes with containerized runners and pass/fail scoring.
Used for: time-boxed flag-capture tasks that isolate skills (web/pwn/rev/crypto/etc.) with containerized scoring.
Used for: full host compromise across recon→exploit→privesc on realistic VMs with scripted scoring.
Used for: targeted exploit generation/execution against apps with known CVEs; measures live-system interaction.
Used for: PoC inputs that crash the vulnerable build and not the patched build under fixed time/memory; sanitizer oracle.
AgentHarm human-authored harmful agent tasks for tool-using agents with benign counterparts, synthetic proxy tools, and a reproducible scoring harness; 110 base tasks (440 with augmentation), 11 categories, 104 tools. arXiv • Best for: measuring refusal vs completion on multi-step tool use and the impact of jailbreaks.
Purple Llama – CyberSecEval - evaluates models’ propensity to assist cyber-offense (exploit/malware) and to generate insecure code; graded-risk tasks with a reproducible harness. Best for: dangerous-capability / misuse-risk scoring (text/IDE, non-agent).
Purpose: Evaluates resistance to prompt-injection and jailbreak attempts in chat/RAG/agent contexts.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Measure, Manage
Lakera PINT Benchmark Prompt-injection benchmark with a curated multilingual test suite, explicit categories (injections, jailbreaks, hard negatives, benign chats/docs), and a reproducible scoring harness (PINT score + notebooks) for fair detector comparison and regression tracking.
JailbreakBench standardized jailbreak prompts + scoring harness; measures refusal/compliance and jailbreak success across models and settings.
Purpose: Assesses AI models for unauthorized modifications, including backdoors and dataset poisoning. Supports trustworthiness and security of model outputs.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Map, Measure
Purpose: Ensures AI security aligns with governance frameworks, industry regulations, and security policies. Supports auditability and risk management.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Govern
Purpose: Evaluates AI for risks like data leakage, membership inference, and model inversion. Helps ensure privacy preservation and compliance.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Measure, Manage
Purpose: Assesses AI for transparency, fairness, and bias mitigation. Ensures AI operates in an interpretable and ethical manner.
NIST AI RMF Alignment: Govern, Map, Measure
Vulnerabilities disclosed in the last 12 months. Related attack patterns, campaigns, malware, and research items are listed separately below.
Flaws or exploit chains in products, frameworks, features, or workflows that can be directly abused by an attacker.
| Name | Description | Source | Disclosure date | CVE(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EchoLeak | A zero-click Microsoft 365 Copilot vulnerability that can exfiltrate sensitive data from Copilot context. | Aim Security | 2025-05-31 | CVE-2025-32711 |
| CurXecute | A Cursor vulnerability that can lead to remote code execution by writing MCP-sensitive files such as .cursor/mcp.json. | GitHub Advisory | 2025-08-02 | CVE-2025-54135 |
| MCPoison | A Cursor vulnerability where trusted MCP configurations can be modified without re-approval, enabling persistent code execution. | Check Point Research | 2025-08-01 | CVE-2025-54136 |
| LangGrinch | A langchain-core serialization injection flaw that can expose secrets and enable unsafe object instantiation. | Cyata | 2025-12-23 | CVE-2025-68664 |
| BodySnatcher | A ServiceNow AI Platform vulnerability that allows unauthenticated user impersonation through Virtual Agent and Now Assist flows. | AppOmni | 2026-01-13 | CVE-2025-12420 |
| Reprompt | A single-click Copilot Personal exploit that abuses crafted URL parameters to exfiltrate data. | Varonis Threat Labs | 2026-01-15 | — |
| Clinejection | A prompt injection and GitHub Actions cache-poisoning chain that could steal publish tokens and compromise releases. | Adnan Khan | 2026-02-09 | — |
| RoguePilot | A GitHub Codespaces and Copilot exploit chain that can steal GITHUB_TOKEN and enable repository takeover. | Orca Security | 2026-02-16 | — |
| Claudy Day | A Claude.ai exploit chain using invisible prompt injection, Files API abuse, and open redirects to exfiltrate chat history. | Oasis Security | 2026-03-18 | — |
Methods, techniques, or recurring abuse models that describe how attackers achieve their goals across one or more systems.
| Name | Description | Source | Disclosure date | CVE(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HashJack | An indirect prompt injection technique that hides malicious instructions inside the URL fragment. | Cato CTRL | 2025-11-25 | — |
| LegalPwn | A prompt injection technique that disguises malicious instructions as legal or compliance text. | Pangea Labs | 2025-07-30 | — |
| AIKatz | A post-compromise technique that steals tokens and session artifacts from desktop LLM apps. | Lumia Security Labs | 2025-11-12 | — |
| Tool Poisoning Attack | An MCP attack pattern where malicious instructions are hidden in tool descriptions visible to the model. | Invariant | 2025-04-01 | — |
| MCP Rug Pull | An MCP pattern where a trusted tool or server changes after approval and becomes malicious. | Invariant | 2025-04-01 | — |
| Cross-Origin Escalation | An MCP pattern where one malicious server influences or redirects trusted tools on another server. | Invariant | 2025-04-11 | — |
| ShadowMQ | A recurring pattern where unsafe ZeroMQ plus pickle deserialization spreads RCE risk across AI systems through code reuse. | Oligo Security | 2025-11-13 | — |
| Living Off AI | A pattern where untrusted external input is later executed inside privileged internal AI workflows. | Cato CTRL | 2025-06-19 | — |
Clusters of malicious activity or operations observed over time against specific targets.
| Name | Description | Source | Disclosure date | CVE(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operation Bizarre Bazaar | An LLMjacking campaign focused on scanning, validating, and monetizing exposed LLM and MCP infrastructure. | Pillar Security | 2026-01-28 | — |
| ShadowRay 2.0 | A follow-on ShadowRay campaign that turned exposed Ray clusters into cryptojacking and botnet-style operations. | Oligo Security | 2025-11 | CVE-2023-48022 |
| ClawHavoc | A supply chain campaign distributing malicious ClawHub and OpenClaw skills through fake prerequisites and external payloads. | Koi Research | 2026-02-01 | — |
Backdoors, implants, or malicious programs used to execute or support attacks.
| Name | Description | Source | Disclosure date | CVE(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SesameOp | A backdoor that abuses the OpenAI Assistants API as a command-and-control channel. | Microsoft Incident Response | 2025-11-03 | — |
📌 (More to be added - A collection of AI security reports, white papers, and academic studies.)
(Core references and syntheses for orientation and shared language.)
(Authoritative definitions for AI/ML security, governance, and risk-use to align terminology across docs and reviews.)
(Systematizations of Knowledge (SoK), surveys, systematic reviews, and mapping studies.)
(Reusable classification schemes-clear dimensions, categories, and labeling rules for attacks, defenses, datasets, and risks.)
Curated market maps of tools and vendors for securing LLM and agentic AI applications across the lifecycle.
| Acronym | Full Form |
|---|---|
| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
| AGI | Artificial General Intelligence |
| ALBERT | A Lite BERT |
| AOC | Area Over Curve |
| ASR | Attack Success Rate |
| BERT | Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers |
| BGMAttack | Black-box Generative Model-based Attack |
| CBA | Composite Backdoor Attack |
| CCPA | California Consumer Privacy Act |
| CNN | Convolutional Neural Network |
| CoT | Chain-of-Thought |
| DAN | Do Anything Now |
| DFS | Depth-First Search |
| DNN | Deep Neural Network |
| DPO | Direct Preference Optimization |
| DP | Differential Privacy |
| FL | Federated Learning |
| GA | Genetic Algorithm |
| GDPR | General Data Protection Regulation |
| GPT | Generative Pre-trained Transformer |
| GRPO | Group Relative Policy Optimization |
| HIPAA | Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act |
| ICL | In-Context Learning |
| KL | Kullback-Leibler Divergence |
| LAS | Leakage-Adjusted Simulatability |
| LM | Language Model |
| LLM | Large Language Model |
| Llama | Large Language Model Meta AI |
| LoRA | Low-Rank Adapter |
| LRM | Large Reasoning Model |
| MCTS | Monte-Carlo Tree Search |
| MIA | Membership Inference Attack |
| MCP | Modern Context Protocol |
| MDP | Masking-Differential Prompting |
| MLM | Masked Language Model |
| MLLM | Multimodal Large Language Model |
| MLRM | Multimodal Large Reasoning Model |
| MoE | Mixture-of-Experts |
| NLP | Natural Language Processing |
| OOD | Out Of Distribution |
| ORM | Outcome Reward Model |
| PI | Prompt Injection |
| PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
| PAIR | Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement |
| PLM | pre-trained Language Model |
| PRM | Process Reward Model |
| QA | Question-Answering |
| RAG | Retrieval-Augmented Generation |
| RL | Reinforcement Learning |
| RLHF | Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback |
| RLVR | Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Reward |
| RoBERTa | Robustly optimized BERT approach |
| SCM | Structural Causal Model |
| SGD | Stochastic Gradient Descent |
| SOTA | State of the Art |
| TAG | Gradient Attack on Transformer-based Language Models |
| VR | Verifiable Reward |
| XLNet | Transformer-XL with autoregressive and autoencoding pre-training |
Contributions are welcome! If you have new resources, tools, or insights to add, feel free to submit a pull request.
This repository follows the Awesome Manifesto guidelines.
© 2025 Tal Eliyahu. Licensed under the MIT License. See LICENSE.
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