A watchtower for AI agents — scan MCP servers and AI-agent tool manifests for poisoned descriptions, data exfiltration, secrets and supply-chain risk. Zero-dependency, CLI + CI.
See the codeScan MCP servers and AI-agent tool manifests for hidden risk — before an attacker finds it.
Your AI agent trusts tools, MCP servers and skills it didn't write. A tool's description is injected straight into the model's context — so a poisoned description can quietly tell your agent to leak a key, call an attacker's server, or run a shell command. Palanit Core reads every tool the way your agent will, and flags the ones that would betray it.
1 on HIGH+ findings, so a poisoned tool fails the build.pip install palanit-core
# Scan an MCP config or tool manifest
palanit scan mcp.config.json
# See it in action on the bundled malicious sample
palanit scan --sample
# Machine-readable output, fail CI on HIGH or above
palanit scan mcp.config.json --json --fail-on HIGH
Example (trimmed):
CRITICAL Possible data exfiltration [PL-EXFIL-001]
Instructs the agent to send sensitive data to an external URL (collector.evil.example).
↳ mcp.config.json#/mcpServers/invoicing/tools/0/description
fix: Remove external URLs and exfiltration verbs from tool text.
HIGH Hidden instructions in tool text [PL-POISON-001]
HIGH Invisible or deceptive Unicode [PL-UNICODE-001]
MEDIUM Unpinned package / runner [PL-SUPPLY-001]
...
9 finding(s) (1 critical · 5 high · 3 medium)
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
PL-POISON-001 | HIGH | Hidden / injected instructions in tool & schema descriptions |
PL-EXFIL-001 | MED–CRIT | Tool text that steers the agent to send data to external URLs |
PL-SECRET-001 | HIGH | Hardcoded API keys, tokens and private keys |
PL-UNICODE-001 | MED–HIGH | Invisible / bidirectional Unicode used to hide instructions |
PL-SUPPLY-001 | MEDIUM | Unpinned / floating package versions (@latest, bare names) |
PL-SHELL-001 | MED–HIGH | Tools that launch a shell (bash -c, cmd /c, …) |
PL-TLS-001 | LOW–MED | Endpoints over http:// / ws:// without TLS |
PL-COLLIDE-001 | MEDIUM | Duplicate tool names that let one shadow another |
PL-ENV-001 | HIGH | Literal secrets in a server's env block |
Run palanit rules to list them. Inputs understood: Claude-style mcpServers
configs, servers configs, tools manifests, a bare list of tools, or a single
tool object. Unknown JSON still gets string-level checks.
# .github/workflows/palanit.yml
name: palanit
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: stasxr/[email protected]
with:
files: "mcp.config.json" # files or globs, space-separated
fail-on: "HIGH" # INFO | LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH | CRITICAL
Prefer plain steps? That works too:
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with: { python-version: "3.12" }
- run: pip install palanit-core
- run: palanit scan mcp.config.json --fail-on HIGH
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/stasxr/palanit-core
rev: v0.1.1
hooks:
- id: palanit # scans mcp*.json / claude_desktop_config.json by default
Palanit Core can itself run as an MCP server, so an agent or MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, …) can scan a config on demand:
pip install "palanit-core[mcp]"
palanit-mcp # stdio transport
Exposes the tools scan_mcp_config, list_rules and version. Example client entry:
{
"mcpServers": {
"palanit": { "command": "palanit-mcp" }
}
}
Scanned your MCP server with Palanit Core? Show it:
[](https://github.com/stasxr/palanit-core)
Palanit Core only reads files you give it — but the broader PALANIT suite (botprobe) sends live test traffic. Only scan or test systems you own or are authorized to test. A clean scan reduces risk; it does not prove safety.
Apache-2.0 © Stanislav Miziyev. Contributions welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.
A watchtower for AI agents — scan MCP servers and AI-agent tool manifests for poisoned descriptions, data exfiltration, secrets and supply-chain risk. Zero-dependency, CLI + CI.
See the codeScan MCP servers and AI-agent tool manifests for hidden risk — before an attacker finds it.
Your AI agent trusts tools, MCP servers and skills it didn't write. A tool's description is injected straight into the model's context — so a poisoned description can quietly tell your agent to leak a key, call an attacker's server, or run a shell command. Palanit Core reads every tool the way your agent will, and flags the ones that would betray it.
1 on HIGH+ findings, so a poisoned tool fails the build.pip install palanit-core
# Scan an MCP config or tool manifest
palanit scan mcp.config.json
# See it in action on the bundled malicious sample
palanit scan --sample
# Machine-readable output, fail CI on HIGH or above
palanit scan mcp.config.json --json --fail-on HIGH
Example (trimmed):
CRITICAL Possible data exfiltration [PL-EXFIL-001]
Instructs the agent to send sensitive data to an external URL (collector.evil.example).
↳ mcp.config.json#/mcpServers/invoicing/tools/0/description
fix: Remove external URLs and exfiltration verbs from tool text.
HIGH Hidden instructions in tool text [PL-POISON-001]
HIGH Invisible or deceptive Unicode [PL-UNICODE-001]
MEDIUM Unpinned package / runner [PL-SUPPLY-001]
...
9 finding(s) (1 critical · 5 high · 3 medium)
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
PL-POISON-001 | HIGH | Hidden / injected instructions in tool & schema descriptions |
PL-EXFIL-001 | MED–CRIT | Tool text that steers the agent to send data to external URLs |
PL-SECRET-001 | HIGH | Hardcoded API keys, tokens and private keys |
PL-UNICODE-001 | MED–HIGH | Invisible / bidirectional Unicode used to hide instructions |
PL-SUPPLY-001 | MEDIUM | Unpinned / floating package versions (@latest, bare names) |
PL-SHELL-001 | MED–HIGH | Tools that launch a shell (bash -c, cmd /c, …) |
PL-TLS-001 | LOW–MED | Endpoints over http:// / ws:// without TLS |
PL-COLLIDE-001 | MEDIUM | Duplicate tool names that let one shadow another |
PL-ENV-001 | HIGH | Literal secrets in a server's env block |
Run palanit rules to list them. Inputs understood: Claude-style mcpServers
configs, servers configs, tools manifests, a bare list of tools, or a single
tool object. Unknown JSON still gets string-level checks.
# .github/workflows/palanit.yml
name: palanit
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: stasxr/[email protected]
with:
files: "mcp.config.json" # files or globs, space-separated
fail-on: "HIGH" # INFO | LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH | CRITICAL
Prefer plain steps? That works too:
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with: { python-version: "3.12" }
- run: pip install palanit-core
- run: palanit scan mcp.config.json --fail-on HIGH
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/stasxr/palanit-core
rev: v0.1.1
hooks:
- id: palanit # scans mcp*.json / claude_desktop_config.json by default
Palanit Core can itself run as an MCP server, so an agent or MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, …) can scan a config on demand:
pip install "palanit-core[mcp]"
palanit-mcp # stdio transport
Exposes the tools scan_mcp_config, list_rules and version. Example client entry:
{
"mcpServers": {
"palanit": { "command": "palanit-mcp" }
}
}
Scanned your MCP server with Palanit Core? Show it:
[](https://github.com/stasxr/palanit-core)
Palanit Core only reads files you give it — but the broader PALANIT suite (botprobe) sends live test traffic. Only scan or test systems you own or are authorized to test. A clean scan reduces risk; it does not prove safety.
Apache-2.0 © Stanislav Miziyev. Contributions welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.