It Is So Dangerous sandbox

This is a tradeoff between full isolation and ability to actually work for AI agents. The sandbox is configured with the stack I need to work with, so you may want to adapt it to your needs.

NOTE: this is not an ideal isolation. This sandbox is tailored for my specific use-cases, and I need things like executables in /tmp for example. Feel free to adapt it to your needs.

By default sandbox is configured to run Oh My Pi agent. You can change that, see Optional section.

Also, I wrote You Don't Need A %Frontier LLM% where the setup and purposes were explained. (Just in case you might be interested in my ranting for some reason.)

• Prerequisites
  • Understanding the threat model
    • Special instructions for UNCENSORED-ABLITERATED-HERETICKED-ULTRA-NEO-MAX-PRO-8K-244Hz enjoyers
  • Optional
• Usage
  • Installation
  • Running
  • Netless runs
  • Updates, modifications, rebuilds

Prerequisites

• docker
• just

Additionally, for the FelonyBench ladder disabled networking runs:

• tinyproxy
• socat

Understanding the threat model

The sandbox with default configuration is designed to be used with an agent that does "usual work" like coding, writing, etc. It might be used for read/blue teaming agents, but requires adjustments in justfile like disabling networking - don't be Anthropic, we're all sick of the FelonyBench already.

So, my main threat model is an agent going "oops, I accidentally nuked your system. That's on me" situations rather than you running a malicious agent asking it to hack pentagon.

Special instructions for UNCENSORED-ABLITERATED-HERETICKED-ULTRA-NEO-MAX-PRO-8K-244Hz enjoyers

DISABLE. DAMN. NETWORKING. --network=none <- this is the way. just run netless does the trick.

Uncensored models can do anything. Depending on the prompt and model quality, it probably will do weird things. Disable the networking. Don't try to claim a place in a felony bench ladder with your Qwen-Fable-ULTRA-MEGA-NEO-HACKER-HERETIC-8b. (Yes, it will be hilarious. No, it's not worth it anyway.)

Optional

1. adapt Dockerfile to your needs
2. adapt justfile to your needs (e.g., networking, mounts, etc.)

Usage

Installation

git clone https://github.com/rakshazi/IISD-sandbox.git ~/.omp/docker

Reminder: this is the moment you read Prerequisites and do modifications.

Alias to use omp instead of just -f ~/.omp/docker/justfile run:

echo "alias omp='just -f ~/.omp/docker/justfile run'" >> ~/.bashrc

now omp your way.

Running

just run

Disabled networking:

just run netless

(Yes, I know you downloaded that ARA-SOMPOA-ABSOLUTE-HERESY finetune, the netless mode is for you.)

Netless runs

--network=none <- the thing the threat model section yells about. Except an agent with zero holes can't think, so exactly two get punched, both on the host side and both over unix sockets. That's just run netless, or omp netless with the alias.

1. api.venice.ai:443 through tinyproxy doing what a proxy should: allowlist, default deny, CONNECT to port 443 only. Inside the container it looks like a boring HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:8118. You are supposed to change it to your provider's host justfile, btw. Or keep Venice - this one is good (ZDR, unrestricted open-weight models, including deliberately uncensored ones).
2. Your local model server (127.0.0.1:8899 on the host by default) for local/* models. Change it as well.

No egress. Web search, direct connections, and whatever clever exfiltration route your model was about to invent: all dead. Provider API endpoints stay reachable by design, because that's where your prompts go anyway, so that's the one pipe to watch.

Host side wants Linux with tinyproxy and socat (pacman -S tinyproxy socat, apt install tinyproxy socat, dnf install tinyproxy socat). Defaults sit at the top of the netless recipe in the justfile, every one of them overridable via env var:

• NETLESS_ALLOW (default api.venice.ai): comma-separated hostnames allowed through the proxy, add your provider endpoints here
• NETLESS_LOCAL_TARGET (default 127.0.0.1:8899): host address of your local model server
• NETLESS_PROXY_PORT / NETLESS_LOCAL_PORT (defaults 8118 / 8899): loopback bridge ports inside the container

Notes

• ~/.omp/docker stays writable in netless runs, so the agent can work on the sandbox itself (justfile / Dockerfile edits apply on the next host-side run)
• One netless session at a time: the recipe takes a lock, so a second omp netless gets told to come back later.
• netless/ is runtime state (sockets, lock, logs), gitignored, sockets are recreated per run, logs append across sessions.
• The proxy keeps receipts in ~/.omp/docker/netless/tinyproxy.log: session markers, allowed CONNECTs, refusals. First file to read when the agent starts mentioning something about internal documents of Australian government.

Updates, modifications, rebuilds

# Wrapper designed after `omp update`: rebuild (update) and run after that
just run update

# OR do build separately from run
just build