m-stepkowski/kubemend

An LLM agent that diagnoses Kubernetes incidents from Observability tools and remediates by opening GitOps pull requests — never touching the cluster directly. Hand-built harness (no agent framework), independent verification gate, and a fault-injection eval lab with reproducible pass-rate benchmarks.

5

stars

149

commits

Python

primary language

Aug 27, 2026

updated

README

kubemend

A GitOps-native Kubernetes remediation agent that can only open pull requests.

It diagnoses incidents from Prometheus metrics and Loki logs, proposes a fix, and verifies that fix itself — helm render → Kyverno policy check → live diff → scope check → live quota headroom — before it ever asks a human to approve anything. It never runs kubectl apply. It has no cluster credentials that can write.

CI License Python Release

Not production-ready: no multi-repo GitOps, no sandboxed tool execution yet. See docs/threat-model.md for what's in and out of scope.


Why

Most "AI SRE agent" demos are impressive and unverifiable — a model claims it fixed something, and you take its word for it. kubemend is built the other way around: the model's claim of success is never trusted. Every run terminates only after an independent validation pipeline says the proposed fix renders cleanly, satisfies policy, produces a real and scoped diff, and touches nothing outside the declared incident. The agent's only actuator is a Git branch and a draft PR — a human still merges.

It's also a from-scratch agent harness, not a wrapper around LangChain/CrewAI/AutoGen. The loop, context management, tool registry, and verification gate are hand-written and documented, because understanding those trade-offs — not gluing a framework together — is the point of the project.

How it works

task ──▶ Loop ──▶ tool calls ──▶ Prometheus / Loki / K8s (read-only)
          │
          └── model claims "done" ──▶ independent verification gate
                                        helm template → kyverno apply
                                        → argocd/kubectl diff → scope check
                                        → live quota headroom
                                        │
                                pass ──▶ draft PR against the GitOps repo
                                fail ──▶ structured failure fed back into the loop
  • Observability: PromQL against Prometheus/Mimir, LogQL against Loki. Swappable behind a provider interface (Dynatrace/CloudWatch are future drop-ins).
  • Cluster access: read-only ServiceAccount, allow-listed resource kinds, no Secret values ever fetched.
  • Remediation: the agent edits Helm values*.yaml only — never templates directly — so diffs stay small and reviewable.
  • Verification: re-run independently by the harness at termination, never taken on the model's word.
  • Everything is evaluated: a hermetic kind-based fault-injection lab reproduces real incidents (bad image tags, OOMKills, missing config keys, broken probes...) with property-based checkers, run N times per scenario to produce pass-rate / cost / iteration tables — not cherry-picked demos. Three more scenarios are adversarial by design: a fix with no values-only solution, an incident whose real cause is out of the declared scope, and a prompt-injection attempt planted in the agent's own log evidence — each expects a handoff or a scope-clean PR, never a plausible-looking wrong answer.

Full design, invariants, and every numeric default with its rationale: ARCHITECTURE.md.

Model providers

main and cheap are each configured independently, so mixing providers across tiers (e.g. Claude on Bedrock for main, DeepSeek for cheap) is a normal configuration, not a special case:

Providermodel.*.providerCoversCredentials
Anthropicanthropic (default)Claude, direct APIANTHROPIC_API_KEY, or an ant auth login profile
OpenAI-compatibleopenai + base_urlOpenAI, DeepSeek, vLLM, Ollama, anything speaking /v1/chat/completionsOPENAI_API_KEY (local/self-hosted endpoints without auth fall back to a placeholder automatically)
AWS BedrockbedrockClaude models only, via Bedrock (Converse API / non-Claude models not yet supported)the standard AWS credential chain (env, profile, or IMDS)
model:
  main:
    provider: bedrock
    name: us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5-v1:0
    aws_region: us-east-1
  cheap:
    provider: openai
    name: deepseek-v4-flash
    base_url: https://api.deepseek.com

See kubemend.yaml's own comments for more examples, and config/pricing.yaml for cost-guardrail pricing — non-Anthropic entries there are placeholders sourced from public pricing pages, not verified against an invoice; check before trusting them for a committed baseline.

Observability providers

query_metrics/search_logs/query_traces are backed by whichever provider observability.provider selects — only one provider's tools are ever registered per run, and observability.enable decides which of the three pillars get registered at all (metrics and logs on by default, traces off). Providers with their own query language change the tool argument names the model sees (promql/logql vs metric_query/ log_query; see docs/knowledge/tool-contracts.md); providers that speak real PromQL/LogQL against a hosted backend (Grafana Cloud) don't:

Providerobservability.providerCredentials
Prometheus + Loki (+ Tempo)prometheus_loki (default)none beyond network access — the lab's read-only ServiceAccount already covers it. Traces come from a self-hosted Tempo at observability.tempo_url; task lab:tempo installs one
Datadogdatadogdatadog_api_key_file/datadog_app_key_file (default .lab/datadog-api-key/.lab/datadog-app-key, gitignored — generate a Datadog API key and an application key with log/metric read scope and write them there, one key per file, no trailing newline needed). Traces (APM span search) need no extra config — the same keys serve all three pillars
Grafana Cloudgrafana_cloudgrafana_cloud_token_file (default .lab/grafana-cloud-token, gitignored — one Grafana Cloud Access Policy token with metrics:read/logs:read scope, no trailing newline needed); grafana_cloud_prometheus_url/_instance_id and grafana_cloud_loki_url/_instance_id are account-specific with no default — copy them from your stack's connection-details page. Traces additionally need grafana_cloud_tempo_url/_instance_id and traces:read on the token
observability:
  provider: datadog
  datadog_site: datadoghq.eu   # datadoghq.com | datadoghq.eu | us3/us5/ap1.datadoghq.com | ...
  datadog_api_key_file: .lab/datadog-api-key
  datadog_app_key_file: .lab/datadog-app-key

To validate the Datadog path against the lab cluster's own data instead of a real incident, task lab:datadog-agent (opt-in, not part of lab:up) installs a real Datadog Agent into the kind cluster reporting its metrics and logs to your org — see DATADOG_SITE=... task lab:datadog-agent and docs/knowledge/lab-and-evals.md.

observability:
  provider: grafana_cloud
  grafana_cloud_prometheus_url: https://prometheus-prod-NN-prod-xx.grafana.net
  grafana_cloud_prometheus_instance_id: "123456"
  grafana_cloud_loki_url: https://logs-prod-NNN.grafana.net
  grafana_cloud_loki_instance_id: "654321"
  grafana_cloud_token_file: .lab/grafana-cloud-token

Same idea for Grafana Cloud: task lab:grafana-agent (opt-in, not part of lab:up) installs Grafana Alloy into the kind cluster reporting the lab's own metrics and logs to your account — see docs/knowledge/lab-and-evals.md.

Install

Every tagged release publishes to both PyPI and ghcr.io:

pip install kubemend
docker pull ghcr.io/m-stepkowski/kubemend:latest
docker run --rm ghcr.io/m-stepkowski/kubemend:latest --help

Either way you'll need model credentials (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY by default — see "Model providers" above) and a kubemend.yaml pointing at your cluster's Prometheus/Loki, kubeconfig, and GitOps repo — see the committed kubemend.yaml's own comments for every field. To run in-cluster instead of from a laptop, see "Deploy in-cluster" below.

Quickstart

Requires Docker (or Rancher Desktop — anything kind can use), uv, and go-task, plus an ANTHROPIC_API_KEY.

The fastest way to see it work end to end — bring up the lab, inject a real fault, run the agent against it, and print the resulting proposal — is:

git clone https://github.com/m-stepkowski/kubemend.git && cd kubemend
uv sync

export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
task lab:up      # kind cluster: gitea, Argo CD, kube-prometheus-stack, Loki, Kyverno
task demo        # inject a fault, run kubemend, show the resulting proposal (~90s)

task demo runs on the cheap model by default; pass -- --model main to use the model the headline sweep below was run on:

task demo -- --model main

To drive it by hand instead of via the demo script:

task lab:forward   # port-forward Prometheus/Loki/gitea/Argo locally, blocks — run in another terminal

kubemend run --task "shop-api pods in namespace shop are crash-looping since 10 minutes ago" \
              --namespace shop --app shop-api

This writes a branch (and, with gitops.backend: gitea, a real draft PR in the lab's gitea instance) plus a full JSONL trace under traces/. See docs/threat-model.md for the trust boundaries and what's still out of scope (single repo, values-only edits, no persistent memory across runs).

Evals

Reproducible pass-rate benchmarks, not anecdotes — every scenario is run N times and reported with cost and iteration counts:

task evals -- --scenarios all -n 5 --model main

v0.1 baseline (claude-sonnet-5, n=5 per scenario, $11.08 total — evals/reports/v0.1-baseline/):

scenariopassavg iterationsavg costp95 wall
bad-image-tag5/57.6$0.2996s
oom-limit5/57.8$0.2666s
missing-configmap-key5/512.0$0.35106s
bad-probe-path4/58.4$0.38348s
bad-env-endpoint5/57.4$0.3861s
quota-conflict5/510.0$0.56290s

29/30 (97%) pass overall. The one failure is a genuine model struggle, not a harness bug: bad-probe-path's failing run hit budget_exhausted after repeated propose_git_change/validate_change cycling without converging.

Adversarial scenarios, M6 baseline (claude-sonnet-5, n=3 per scenario, $4.01 total, capped at a $5 budget for this sweep — evals/reports/m6-baseline/):

scenariopassavg iterationsavg cost
fix-needs-template-change2/38.7$0.43
scope-trap3/315.0$0.71
log-injection3/36.3$0.19

n=3 here, not n=10 — scope-trap's real per-run cost (15 iterations, $0.71) made a larger sweep infeasible under the budget for this baseline; reported as an honest n=3 sample, not rounded up. The one failure (fix-needs-template-change) is a real, specific model gap: it correctly diagnosed a hardcoded probe scheme as the root cause but hedged on the handoff instead of committing to "no values-only fix exists." See docs/threat-model.md §9 for the log-injection scenario's full trace excerpt.

Cheap model (claude-haiku-4-5) numbers, used for day-to-day regression sweeps during development, are lower and cheaper — see evals/reports/latest/.

Deploy in-cluster

Pointing kubemend at your own cluster and GitOps repo, rather than the lab, involves a few decisions (which observability backend, which trigger, whether your GitOps repo matches the single-repo shape kubemend expects today) — docs/getting-started.md walks that sequence end to end. The rest of this section covers the mechanics once those decisions are made.

A kubemend run from a laptop needs a kubeconfig holding the full read-only RBAC kubemend uses. The Helm chart exists to narrow that: install it once and an on-call engineer only needs permission to create a Job in one namespace, not the reader's own permissions.

helm install kubemend charts/kubemend -n kubemend-system --create-namespace

This installs the reader ServiceAccount and RBAC (namespace-scoped Role by default; --set rbac.clusterScoped=true for a ClusterRole) and spawns nothing — job.enabled defaults to false. To trigger a run:

helm template kubemend charts/kubemend \
  --namespace kubemend-system \
  --set job.enabled=true \
  --set job.namespace=shop \
  --set job.app=shop-api \
  --set job.task="shop-api pods are crash-looping" \
  -s templates/job.yaml \
  | kubectl create -f -

The Job runs with its own tightly-scoped in-cluster ServiceAccount (kubernetes.in_cluster: true, no kubeconfig file involved) via the same ghcr.io/m-stepkowski/kubemend image published on each release. See charts/kubemend/README.md for wiring in a GitOps repo checkout and the full values reference.

Alert-triggered automation is also available as of M8b: --set operator.enabled=true deploys a small webhook receiver (stdlib http.server, no framework) that creates the same kind of Job on its own when Alertmanager fires, gated by a required bearer token and a per-scope cooldown. It is a distinct, narrower-RBAC identity from both the reader and the manual-trigger path, and does not change what happens once a Job starts — every run still goes through the same untrusted-model loop and verification gate. See charts/kubemend/README.md's "Alert-triggered operator" section to enable it, and docs/threat-model.md §11 before doing so in a real cluster.

Project layout

kubemend/          harness core, tools, gitops module, verification gate
prompts/           versioned system/compaction/handoff prompts
policies/          Kyverno pack (shared by admission and the validator)
lab/               kind bootstrap, lab GitOps repo, fault-injection scenarios
evals/             sweep runner + committed baseline reports
tests/             unit (FakeLLM, no network) + integration (against the lab)
docs/knowledge/    design contracts — read before modifying core/, tools/, or scenarios

Full tree and rationale for each module: ARCHITECTURE.md §9.

Contributing

Not yet open for external contributions — still working through the milestones in IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md. Issues and design discussion welcome in the meantime.

License

Apache 2.0

Contributors

m-stepkowski

149 commits

m-stepkowski/kubemend

An LLM agent that diagnoses Kubernetes incidents from Observability tools and remediates by opening GitOps pull requests — never touching the cluster directly. Hand-built harness (no agent framework), independent verification gate, and a fault-injection eval lab with reproducible pass-rate benchmarks.

5

stars

149

commits

Python

primary language

Aug 27, 2026

updated

README

kubemend

A GitOps-native Kubernetes remediation agent that can only open pull requests.

It diagnoses incidents from Prometheus metrics and Loki logs, proposes a fix, and verifies that fix itself — helm render → Kyverno policy check → live diff → scope check → live quota headroom — before it ever asks a human to approve anything. It never runs kubectl apply. It has no cluster credentials that can write.

CI License Python Release

Not production-ready: no multi-repo GitOps, no sandboxed tool execution yet. See docs/threat-model.md for what's in and out of scope.


Why

Most "AI SRE agent" demos are impressive and unverifiable — a model claims it fixed something, and you take its word for it. kubemend is built the other way around: the model's claim of success is never trusted. Every run terminates only after an independent validation pipeline says the proposed fix renders cleanly, satisfies policy, produces a real and scoped diff, and touches nothing outside the declared incident. The agent's only actuator is a Git branch and a draft PR — a human still merges.

It's also a from-scratch agent harness, not a wrapper around LangChain/CrewAI/AutoGen. The loop, context management, tool registry, and verification gate are hand-written and documented, because understanding those trade-offs — not gluing a framework together — is the point of the project.

How it works

task ──▶ Loop ──▶ tool calls ──▶ Prometheus / Loki / K8s (read-only)
          │
          └── model claims "done" ──▶ independent verification gate
                                        helm template → kyverno apply
                                        → argocd/kubectl diff → scope check
                                        → live quota headroom
                                        │
                                pass ──▶ draft PR against the GitOps repo
                                fail ──▶ structured failure fed back into the loop
  • Observability: PromQL against Prometheus/Mimir, LogQL against Loki. Swappable behind a provider interface (Dynatrace/CloudWatch are future drop-ins).
  • Cluster access: read-only ServiceAccount, allow-listed resource kinds, no Secret values ever fetched.
  • Remediation: the agent edits Helm values*.yaml only — never templates directly — so diffs stay small and reviewable.
  • Verification: re-run independently by the harness at termination, never taken on the model's word.
  • Everything is evaluated: a hermetic kind-based fault-injection lab reproduces real incidents (bad image tags, OOMKills, missing config keys, broken probes...) with property-based checkers, run N times per scenario to produce pass-rate / cost / iteration tables — not cherry-picked demos. Three more scenarios are adversarial by design: a fix with no values-only solution, an incident whose real cause is out of the declared scope, and a prompt-injection attempt planted in the agent's own log evidence — each expects a handoff or a scope-clean PR, never a plausible-looking wrong answer.

Full design, invariants, and every numeric default with its rationale: ARCHITECTURE.md.

Model providers

main and cheap are each configured independently, so mixing providers across tiers (e.g. Claude on Bedrock for main, DeepSeek for cheap) is a normal configuration, not a special case:

Providermodel.*.providerCoversCredentials
Anthropicanthropic (default)Claude, direct APIANTHROPIC_API_KEY, or an ant auth login profile
OpenAI-compatibleopenai + base_urlOpenAI, DeepSeek, vLLM, Ollama, anything speaking /v1/chat/completionsOPENAI_API_KEY (local/self-hosted endpoints without auth fall back to a placeholder automatically)
AWS BedrockbedrockClaude models only, via Bedrock (Converse API / non-Claude models not yet supported)the standard AWS credential chain (env, profile, or IMDS)
model:
  main:
    provider: bedrock
    name: us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5-v1:0
    aws_region: us-east-1
  cheap:
    provider: openai
    name: deepseek-v4-flash
    base_url: https://api.deepseek.com

See kubemend.yaml's own comments for more examples, and config/pricing.yaml for cost-guardrail pricing — non-Anthropic entries there are placeholders sourced from public pricing pages, not verified against an invoice; check before trusting them for a committed baseline.

Observability providers

query_metrics/search_logs/query_traces are backed by whichever provider observability.provider selects — only one provider's tools are ever registered per run, and observability.enable decides which of the three pillars get registered at all (metrics and logs on by default, traces off). Providers with their own query language change the tool argument names the model sees (promql/logql vs metric_query/ log_query; see docs/knowledge/tool-contracts.md); providers that speak real PromQL/LogQL against a hosted backend (Grafana Cloud) don't:

Providerobservability.providerCredentials
Prometheus + Loki (+ Tempo)prometheus_loki (default)none beyond network access — the lab's read-only ServiceAccount already covers it. Traces come from a self-hosted Tempo at observability.tempo_url; task lab:tempo installs one
Datadogdatadogdatadog_api_key_file/datadog_app_key_file (default .lab/datadog-api-key/.lab/datadog-app-key, gitignored — generate a Datadog API key and an application key with log/metric read scope and write them there, one key per file, no trailing newline needed). Traces (APM span search) need no extra config — the same keys serve all three pillars
Grafana Cloudgrafana_cloudgrafana_cloud_token_file (default .lab/grafana-cloud-token, gitignored — one Grafana Cloud Access Policy token with metrics:read/logs:read scope, no trailing newline needed); grafana_cloud_prometheus_url/_instance_id and grafana_cloud_loki_url/_instance_id are account-specific with no default — copy them from your stack's connection-details page. Traces additionally need grafana_cloud_tempo_url/_instance_id and traces:read on the token
observability:
  provider: datadog
  datadog_site: datadoghq.eu   # datadoghq.com | datadoghq.eu | us3/us5/ap1.datadoghq.com | ...
  datadog_api_key_file: .lab/datadog-api-key
  datadog_app_key_file: .lab/datadog-app-key

To validate the Datadog path against the lab cluster's own data instead of a real incident, task lab:datadog-agent (opt-in, not part of lab:up) installs a real Datadog Agent into the kind cluster reporting its metrics and logs to your org — see DATADOG_SITE=... task lab:datadog-agent and docs/knowledge/lab-and-evals.md.

observability:
  provider: grafana_cloud
  grafana_cloud_prometheus_url: https://prometheus-prod-NN-prod-xx.grafana.net
  grafana_cloud_prometheus_instance_id: "123456"
  grafana_cloud_loki_url: https://logs-prod-NNN.grafana.net
  grafana_cloud_loki_instance_id: "654321"
  grafana_cloud_token_file: .lab/grafana-cloud-token

Same idea for Grafana Cloud: task lab:grafana-agent (opt-in, not part of lab:up) installs Grafana Alloy into the kind cluster reporting the lab's own metrics and logs to your account — see docs/knowledge/lab-and-evals.md.

Install

Every tagged release publishes to both PyPI and ghcr.io:

pip install kubemend
docker pull ghcr.io/m-stepkowski/kubemend:latest
docker run --rm ghcr.io/m-stepkowski/kubemend:latest --help

Either way you'll need model credentials (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY by default — see "Model providers" above) and a kubemend.yaml pointing at your cluster's Prometheus/Loki, kubeconfig, and GitOps repo — see the committed kubemend.yaml's own comments for every field. To run in-cluster instead of from a laptop, see "Deploy in-cluster" below.

Quickstart

Requires Docker (or Rancher Desktop — anything kind can use), uv, and go-task, plus an ANTHROPIC_API_KEY.

The fastest way to see it work end to end — bring up the lab, inject a real fault, run the agent against it, and print the resulting proposal — is:

git clone https://github.com/m-stepkowski/kubemend.git && cd kubemend
uv sync

export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
task lab:up      # kind cluster: gitea, Argo CD, kube-prometheus-stack, Loki, Kyverno
task demo        # inject a fault, run kubemend, show the resulting proposal (~90s)

task demo runs on the cheap model by default; pass -- --model main to use the model the headline sweep below was run on:

task demo -- --model main

To drive it by hand instead of via the demo script:

task lab:forward   # port-forward Prometheus/Loki/gitea/Argo locally, blocks — run in another terminal

kubemend run --task "shop-api pods in namespace shop are crash-looping since 10 minutes ago" \
              --namespace shop --app shop-api

This writes a branch (and, with gitops.backend: gitea, a real draft PR in the lab's gitea instance) plus a full JSONL trace under traces/. See docs/threat-model.md for the trust boundaries and what's still out of scope (single repo, values-only edits, no persistent memory across runs).

Evals

Reproducible pass-rate benchmarks, not anecdotes — every scenario is run N times and reported with cost and iteration counts:

task evals -- --scenarios all -n 5 --model main

v0.1 baseline (claude-sonnet-5, n=5 per scenario, $11.08 total — evals/reports/v0.1-baseline/):

scenariopassavg iterationsavg costp95 wall
bad-image-tag5/57.6$0.2996s
oom-limit5/57.8$0.2666s
missing-configmap-key5/512.0$0.35106s
bad-probe-path4/58.4$0.38348s
bad-env-endpoint5/57.4$0.3861s
quota-conflict5/510.0$0.56290s

29/30 (97%) pass overall. The one failure is a genuine model struggle, not a harness bug: bad-probe-path's failing run hit budget_exhausted after repeated propose_git_change/validate_change cycling without converging.

Adversarial scenarios, M6 baseline (claude-sonnet-5, n=3 per scenario, $4.01 total, capped at a $5 budget for this sweep — evals/reports/m6-baseline/):

scenariopassavg iterationsavg cost
fix-needs-template-change2/38.7$0.43
scope-trap3/315.0$0.71
log-injection3/36.3$0.19

n=3 here, not n=10 — scope-trap's real per-run cost (15 iterations, $0.71) made a larger sweep infeasible under the budget for this baseline; reported as an honest n=3 sample, not rounded up. The one failure (fix-needs-template-change) is a real, specific model gap: it correctly diagnosed a hardcoded probe scheme as the root cause but hedged on the handoff instead of committing to "no values-only fix exists." See docs/threat-model.md §9 for the log-injection scenario's full trace excerpt.

Cheap model (claude-haiku-4-5) numbers, used for day-to-day regression sweeps during development, are lower and cheaper — see evals/reports/latest/.

Deploy in-cluster

Pointing kubemend at your own cluster and GitOps repo, rather than the lab, involves a few decisions (which observability backend, which trigger, whether your GitOps repo matches the single-repo shape kubemend expects today) — docs/getting-started.md walks that sequence end to end. The rest of this section covers the mechanics once those decisions are made.

A kubemend run from a laptop needs a kubeconfig holding the full read-only RBAC kubemend uses. The Helm chart exists to narrow that: install it once and an on-call engineer only needs permission to create a Job in one namespace, not the reader's own permissions.

helm install kubemend charts/kubemend -n kubemend-system --create-namespace

This installs the reader ServiceAccount and RBAC (namespace-scoped Role by default; --set rbac.clusterScoped=true for a ClusterRole) and spawns nothing — job.enabled defaults to false. To trigger a run:

helm template kubemend charts/kubemend \
  --namespace kubemend-system \
  --set job.enabled=true \
  --set job.namespace=shop \
  --set job.app=shop-api \
  --set job.task="shop-api pods are crash-looping" \
  -s templates/job.yaml \
  | kubectl create -f -

The Job runs with its own tightly-scoped in-cluster ServiceAccount (kubernetes.in_cluster: true, no kubeconfig file involved) via the same ghcr.io/m-stepkowski/kubemend image published on each release. See charts/kubemend/README.md for wiring in a GitOps repo checkout and the full values reference.

Alert-triggered automation is also available as of M8b: --set operator.enabled=true deploys a small webhook receiver (stdlib http.server, no framework) that creates the same kind of Job on its own when Alertmanager fires, gated by a required bearer token and a per-scope cooldown. It is a distinct, narrower-RBAC identity from both the reader and the manual-trigger path, and does not change what happens once a Job starts — every run still goes through the same untrusted-model loop and verification gate. See charts/kubemend/README.md's "Alert-triggered operator" section to enable it, and docs/threat-model.md §11 before doing so in a real cluster.

Project layout

kubemend/          harness core, tools, gitops module, verification gate
prompts/           versioned system/compaction/handoff prompts
policies/          Kyverno pack (shared by admission and the validator)
lab/               kind bootstrap, lab GitOps repo, fault-injection scenarios
evals/             sweep runner + committed baseline reports
tests/             unit (FakeLLM, no network) + integration (against the lab)
docs/knowledge/    design contracts — read before modifying core/, tools/, or scenarios

Full tree and rationale for each module: ARCHITECTURE.md §9.

Contributing

Not yet open for external contributions — still working through the milestones in IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md. Issues and design discussion welcome in the meantime.

License

Apache 2.0

Contributors

m-stepkowski

149 commits

Languages

Python

98.0%

Jinja

1.1%