Praveenrajus/jevify-qwen3.5-4b-base-readout-coh

Model

Qwen3.5-4B-Base, readout fine-tuned (LoRA, + coherence)

0

4 commits

1 linked in READMEs

updated Sep 25, 2026

See the code

README

Qwen3.5-4B-Base, readout fine-tuned (LoRA, + coherence)

A System One decision model: it reads a state, answers typed questions (choice, score, noul) and returns calibrated probability distributions your code can branch on β€” it never writes text. This repo is a rank-16 LoRA (21,233,664 parameters) on Qwen/Qwen3.5-4B-Base, merged into the weights at load, trained on its own decision readout with a coherence penalty.

At a glance β€” accuracy 0.747 Β· ECE 0.058 Β· held-out 0.783 Β· TVD to human labels 0.314 Β· sure loss 0.033
same order, Qwen3.5-4B-Base, untuned (Tier 0): 0.647 / 0.095 / 0.710 / 0.456 / 0.188
same order, Jev 1.13.0: 0.733 / 0.113 / 0.835 / 0.432 / 0.081

jev-bench Β· leaderboard Β· findings Β· code

Use it

from jevify import load_jevified

model = load_jevified("Praveenrajus/jevify-qwen3.5-4b-base-readout-coh")
model.ask({"text": "The battery lasted two days on a single charge."},
          {"q": {"type": "noul", "instructions": "Is the review positive?"}})

jevify-serve --model Praveenrajus/jevify-qwen3.5-4b-base-readout-coh serves it as a drop-in for the TypeSafe SDK (TYPESAFE_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8000). The backbone is pulled from its own repo at load, pinned to commit 1001bb4d826a52d1f399e183466143f4da7b741b.

Results

Every number is on the jev-bench test splits (22,773 records) or the study's other test suites, scored the same way for every model; the rows under this model are references from the same study.

Decisions and calibration

modelaccECEBrierheld-out accTVD to human labels
this model0.7470.0580.3180.7830.314
Qwen3.5-4B-Base, untuned (Tier 0)0.6470.0950.4240.7100.456
same recipe, supervised only0.7410.0640.3240.7690.324
same recipe from the instruct model0.7510.0580.3160.7920.303
Jev 1.13.0 (TypeSafe API)0.7330.1130.3490.8350.432

Coherence and invariance β€” sure loss: mean dΒ² over 4,749 question families (0 = perfectly coherent); order flip: how often the top answer changes when options are shuffled; tag TVD: how much the distribution moves when option tags change from A–J to other identifiers.

modelsure lossshare incoherentorder fliptag TVDK=2β†’max acc drop
this model0.0330.3960.0580.0210.224
Qwen3.5-4B-Base, untuned (Tier 0)0.1880.9820.1910.0300.371
same recipe, supervised only0.2710.9150.0640.0200.237
same recipe from the instruct model0.0290.3470.0570.0230.230
Jev 1.13.0 (TypeSafe API)0.0810.7250.046β€”0.246

Out of distribution β€” stated rules (LegalBench, rule given in the question), none-of-the-above when the gold option is removed, injected-instruction hijack rate, and three community Jev benchmarks.

modelstated rule'none' when gonehijackphishing AUROCtool risk
this model0.7340.6120.0980.8450.900
Qwen3.5-4B-Base, untuned (Tier 0)0.6270.3560.3010.9450.867
same recipe, supervised only0.7300.6560.1330.8860.817
same recipe from the instruct model0.7230.6820.0890.9290.900
Jev 1.13.0 (TypeSafe API)0.9240.7440.2050.6880.933

Reproduction check. Loading this folder with load_jevified and re-scoring 72 jev-bench test records from six sources reproduced the training run's own test predictions: 0 changed choice answers, mean largest |Ξ”p| 0.005, max 0.022 (the adapter is merged into bf16 weights at load).

How it was trained

The model is trained on its own decision readout β€” the distribution over the allowed answers read at the answer position, one forward pass, no decoding β€” with the primitive's proper scoring rule, plus a coherence penalty (weight 1.0): every training question comes with automatically derived siblings (the options as yes/no questions, the negation, the threshold questions of a scale), and the de Finetti sure loss of the family's answers is penalised, so the model's answers to related questions stay mutually consistent. Options are shuffled per family. Training data: the train splits of the 16 non-held-out jev-bench sources (5,885 families, at most 400 records per source); lr 3e-05, 2 epochs, best epoch by validation loss (epoch 0), seed 0. A Tier 0 recipe (temperature per primitive, Noul bias, option-order permutations) was then fitted on validation splits. The six held-out sources (clinc150, arc_challenge, yelp5, measuring_hate_speech, fever_evidence, strategyqa_grounded) never appeared in training.

Files

  • jevify_config.json β€” the recipe, the backbone and the training settings load_jevified reads
  • lora/ β€” the adapter, merged into the backbone at load
  • results/test_metrics.json β€” every jev-bench config; recipe.json β€” the fitted recipe
  • results/coherence.json, probes.json, tags.json β€” the coherence, probe and tag tests
  • results/train.json β€” the training log; summary.json β€” this model's row of the study table
  • results/verification.json β€” the reproduction check reported under Results

Limitations

  • One training seed per repo branch; out-of-distribution numbers in particular vary between identical runs, so compare arms across seeds before drawing conclusions.
  • The phishing benchmark's decision threshold shifts after fine-tuning (ranking, AUROC, is preserved); a one-number log-odds shift fitted on a handful of labelled emails repairs it.
  • English only; the recipe was fitted on jev-bench validation splits and may need refitting on a very different domain.
calibration
coherence
decision-model
jevify
safetensors
system-one

Praveenrajus/jevify-qwen3.5-4b-base-readout-coh

Model

Qwen3.5-4B-Base, readout fine-tuned (LoRA, + coherence)

0

4 commits

1 linked in READMEs

updated Sep 25, 2026

See the code

README

Qwen3.5-4B-Base, readout fine-tuned (LoRA, + coherence)

A System One decision model: it reads a state, answers typed questions (choice, score, noul) and returns calibrated probability distributions your code can branch on β€” it never writes text. This repo is a rank-16 LoRA (21,233,664 parameters) on Qwen/Qwen3.5-4B-Base, merged into the weights at load, trained on its own decision readout with a coherence penalty.

At a glance β€” accuracy 0.747 Β· ECE 0.058 Β· held-out 0.783 Β· TVD to human labels 0.314 Β· sure loss 0.033
same order, Qwen3.5-4B-Base, untuned (Tier 0): 0.647 / 0.095 / 0.710 / 0.456 / 0.188
same order, Jev 1.13.0: 0.733 / 0.113 / 0.835 / 0.432 / 0.081

jev-bench Β· leaderboard Β· findings Β· code

Use it

from jevify import load_jevified

model = load_jevified("Praveenrajus/jevify-qwen3.5-4b-base-readout-coh")
model.ask({"text": "The battery lasted two days on a single charge."},
          {"q": {"type": "noul", "instructions": "Is the review positive?"}})

jevify-serve --model Praveenrajus/jevify-qwen3.5-4b-base-readout-coh serves it as a drop-in for the TypeSafe SDK (TYPESAFE_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8000). The backbone is pulled from its own repo at load, pinned to commit 1001bb4d826a52d1f399e183466143f4da7b741b.

Results

Every number is on the jev-bench test splits (22,773 records) or the study's other test suites, scored the same way for every model; the rows under this model are references from the same study.

Decisions and calibration

modelaccECEBrierheld-out accTVD to human labels
this model0.7470.0580.3180.7830.314
Qwen3.5-4B-Base, untuned (Tier 0)0.6470.0950.4240.7100.456
same recipe, supervised only0.7410.0640.3240.7690.324
same recipe from the instruct model0.7510.0580.3160.7920.303
Jev 1.13.0 (TypeSafe API)0.7330.1130.3490.8350.432

Coherence and invariance β€” sure loss: mean dΒ² over 4,749 question families (0 = perfectly coherent); order flip: how often the top answer changes when options are shuffled; tag TVD: how much the distribution moves when option tags change from A–J to other identifiers.

modelsure lossshare incoherentorder fliptag TVDK=2β†’max acc drop
this model0.0330.3960.0580.0210.224
Qwen3.5-4B-Base, untuned (Tier 0)0.1880.9820.1910.0300.371
same recipe, supervised only0.2710.9150.0640.0200.237
same recipe from the instruct model0.0290.3470.0570.0230.230
Jev 1.13.0 (TypeSafe API)0.0810.7250.046β€”0.246

Out of distribution β€” stated rules (LegalBench, rule given in the question), none-of-the-above when the gold option is removed, injected-instruction hijack rate, and three community Jev benchmarks.

modelstated rule'none' when gonehijackphishing AUROCtool risk
this model0.7340.6120.0980.8450.900
Qwen3.5-4B-Base, untuned (Tier 0)0.6270.3560.3010.9450.867
same recipe, supervised only0.7300.6560.1330.8860.817
same recipe from the instruct model0.7230.6820.0890.9290.900
Jev 1.13.0 (TypeSafe API)0.9240.7440.2050.6880.933

Reproduction check. Loading this folder with load_jevified and re-scoring 72 jev-bench test records from six sources reproduced the training run's own test predictions: 0 changed choice answers, mean largest |Ξ”p| 0.005, max 0.022 (the adapter is merged into bf16 weights at load).

How it was trained

The model is trained on its own decision readout β€” the distribution over the allowed answers read at the answer position, one forward pass, no decoding β€” with the primitive's proper scoring rule, plus a coherence penalty (weight 1.0): every training question comes with automatically derived siblings (the options as yes/no questions, the negation, the threshold questions of a scale), and the de Finetti sure loss of the family's answers is penalised, so the model's answers to related questions stay mutually consistent. Options are shuffled per family. Training data: the train splits of the 16 non-held-out jev-bench sources (5,885 families, at most 400 records per source); lr 3e-05, 2 epochs, best epoch by validation loss (epoch 0), seed 0. A Tier 0 recipe (temperature per primitive, Noul bias, option-order permutations) was then fitted on validation splits. The six held-out sources (clinc150, arc_challenge, yelp5, measuring_hate_speech, fever_evidence, strategyqa_grounded) never appeared in training.

Files

  • jevify_config.json β€” the recipe, the backbone and the training settings load_jevified reads
  • lora/ β€” the adapter, merged into the backbone at load
  • results/test_metrics.json β€” every jev-bench config; recipe.json β€” the fitted recipe
  • results/coherence.json, probes.json, tags.json β€” the coherence, probe and tag tests
  • results/train.json β€” the training log; summary.json β€” this model's row of the study table
  • results/verification.json β€” the reproduction check reported under Results

Limitations

  • One training seed per repo branch; out-of-distribution numbers in particular vary between identical runs, so compare arms across seeds before drawing conclusions.
  • The phishing benchmark's decision threshold shifts after fine-tuning (ranking, AUROC, is preserved); a one-number log-odds shift fitted on a handful of labelled emails repairs it.
  • English only; the recipe was fitted on jev-bench validation splits and may need refitting on a very different domain.
calibration
coherence
decision-model
jevify
safetensors
system-one