Landrun

A lightweight, secure sandbox for running Linux processes using Landlock. Think firejail, but with kernel-level security and minimal overhead.

Linux Landlock is a kernel-native security module that lets unprivileged processes sandbox themselves.

Landrun is designed to make it practical to sandbox any command with fine-grained filesystem and network access controls. No root. No containers. No SELinux/AppArmor configs.

It's lightweight, auditable, and wraps Landlock up to v9 features (file access, TCP restrictions, IPC scoping, and UNIX-socket controls).

Binaries are not trustworthy

Features

• 🔒 Kernel-level security using Landlock (up to ABI v9)
• 🚀 Lightweight and fast execution
• 🛡️ Fine-grained access control for directories and files
• 🔄 Support for read and write paths
• ⚡ Path-specific execution permissions
• 🌐 TCP network access control (binding and connecting)
• 📡 IPC scoping for abstract UNIX sockets and signals (ABI v6+)
• 🔌 Pathname UNIX domain socket connect/sendmsg control (ABI v9+)
• 📝 Audit logging configuration for Landlock denials (ABI v7+)

Demo

Requirements

• Linux kernel 5.13 or later with Landlock enabled
• Linux kernel 6.7 or later for network restrictions (TCP bind/connect)
• Go 1.24 or later (for building from source)

By default landrun targets the highest Landlock ABI (v9). On older kernels, pass --best-effort so it gracefully degrades to the best ABI the running kernel supports (see Best-Effort Mode).

Installation

Quick Install

go install github.com/zouuup/landrun/cmd/landrun@latest

From Source

git clone https://github.com/zouuup/landrun.git
cd landrun
go build -o landrun cmd/landrun/main.go
sudo cp landrun /usr/local/bin/

Distros

Arch (AUR)

• stable maintained by Vcalv
• latest commit maintained by juxuanu

Slackware

maintained by r1w1s1

Slackbuild

sudo sbopkg -i packagename

Debian/Ubuntu

Available in Ubuntu since questing / resolute (26.04 LTS), available in Debian since forky.

sudo apt install landrun

Usage

Basic syntax:

landrun [options] <command> [args...]

Options

• --ro <path>: Allow read-only access to specified path (can be specified multiple times or as comma-separated values)
• --rox <path>: Allow read-only access with execution to specified path (can be specified multiple times or as comma-separated values)
• --rw <path>: Allow read-write access to specified path (can be specified multiple times or as comma-separated values)
• --rwx <path>: Allow read-write access with execution to specified path (can be specified multiple times or as comma-separated values)
• --unix <path>: Allow connect(2)/sendmsg(2) on the specified pathname UNIX domain socket (Landlock ABI v9+; can be specified multiple times or as comma-separated values)
• --bind-tcp <port>: Allow binding to specified TCP port (can be specified multiple times or as comma-separated values)
• --connect-tcp <port>: Allow connecting to specified TCP port (can be specified multiple times or as comma-separated values)
• --env <var>: Environment variable to pass to the sandboxed command (format: KEY=VALUE or just KEY to pass current value)
• --best-effort: Use best effort mode, falling back to less restrictive sandbox if necessary [default: disabled]
• --log-level <level>: Set logging level (error, info, debug) [default: "error"]
• --unrestricted-network: Allows unrestricted network access (disables all network restrictions)
• --unrestricted-filesystem: Allows unrestricted filesystem access (disables all filesystem restrictions)
• --unrestricted-scoped: Allows unrestricted IPC scoping, i.e. does not restrict abstract UNIX sockets and signals (Landlock ABI v6+) [default: disabled]
• --ignore-missing: Gracefully ignore paths that do not exist instead of failing [default: disabled]
• --log-disable-originating: Disable audit logging of denials from the originating process (Landlock ABI v7+)
• --log-enable-subprocesses: Enable audit logging of denials after execve(2) in subprocesses (Landlock ABI v7+)
• --log-disable-subdomains: Disable audit logging of denials from nested Landlock domains (Landlock ABI v7+)
• --add-exec: Automatically adds the executing binary to --rox
• --ldd: Automatically adds required libraries to --rox

Important Notes

• You must explicitly add the directory or files to the command you want to run with --rox flag
• For system commands, you typically need to include /usr/bin, /usr/lib, and other system directories
• Use --rwx for directories or files where you need both write access and the ability to execute files
• Network restrictions require Linux kernel 6.7 or later with Landlock ABI v4
• By default, no environment variables are passed to the sandboxed command. Use --env to explicitly pass environment variables
• The --best-effort flag allows graceful degradation on older kernels that don't support all requested restrictions. Because the default target is Landlock ABI v9, you will usually want --best-effort unless you are on a very recent kernel
• Paths can be specified either using multiple flags or as comma-separated values (e.g., --ro /usr,/lib,/home)
• If no paths or network rules are specified and neither unrestricted flag is set, landrun will apply maximum restrictions (denying all access)
• By default, IPC scoping is restricted: the sandboxed process cannot connect to abstract UNIX sockets or send signals to processes outside its Landlock domain (ABI v6+). Use --unrestricted-scoped if this breaks your workload (e.g. some X11 or D-Bus setups)
• On ABI v9+ kernels, connecting to pathname UNIX domain sockets created outside the sandbox (e.g. DNS/NSS via nscd, D-Bus, database sockets) is restricted. Grant access to specific sockets with --unix <path>

Environment Variables

• LANDRUN_LOG_LEVEL: Set logging level (error, info, debug)

Examples

1. Run a command that allows exec access to a specific file

landrun --rox /usr/bin/ls --rox /usr/lib --ro /home ls /home

2. Run a command with read-only access to a directory:

landrun --rox /usr/ --ro /path/to/dir ls /path/to/dir

3. Run a command with write access to a directory:

landrun --rox /usr/bin --ro /lib --rw /path/to/dir touch /path/to/dir/newfile

4. Run a command with write access to a file:

landrun --rox /usr/bin --ro /lib --rw /path/to/dir/newfile touch /path/to/dir/newfile

5. Run a command with execution permissions:

landrun --rox /usr/ --ro /lib,/lib64 /usr/bin/bash

6. Run with debug logging:

landrun --log-level debug --rox /usr/ --ro /lib,/lib64,/path/to/dir ls /path/to/dir

7. Run with network restrictions:

landrun --rox /usr/ --ro /lib,/lib64 --bind-tcp 8080 --connect-tcp 80 /usr/bin/my-server

This will allow the program to only bind to TCP port 8080 and connect to TCP port 80.

8. Run a DNS client with appropriate permissions:

landrun --log-level debug --ro /etc,/usr --rox /usr/ --connect-tcp 443 nc kernel.org 443

This allows connections to port 443, requires access to /etc/resolv.conf for resolving DNS.

9. Run a web server with selective network permissions:

landrun --rox /usr/bin --ro /lib,/lib64,/var/www --rwx /var/log --bind-tcp 80,443 /usr/bin/nginx

10. Running anything without providing parameters is... maximum security jail!

landrun ls

11. If you keep getting permission denied without knowing what exactly going on, best to use strace with it.

landrun --rox /usr strace -f -e trace=all ls

12. Run with specific environment variables:

landrun --rox /usr --ro /etc --env HOME --env PATH --env CUSTOM_VAR=my_value -- env

This example passes the current HOME and PATH variables, plus a custom variable named CUSTOM_VAR.

13. Run command with explicity access to files instead of directories:

landrun --rox /usr/lib/libc.so.6 --rox /usr/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2  --rox /usr/bin/true /usr/bin/true

14. Run a command with --add-exec which automatically adds target binary to --rox

landrun --rox /usr/lib/ --add-exec /usr/bin/true

15. Run a command with --ldd and --add-exec which automatically adds required libraries and target binary to --rox

landrun --ldd --add-exec /usr/bin/true

Note that shared libs always need exec permission due to how they are loaded, PROT_EXEC on mmap() etc.

16. Allow connecting to a pathname UNIX domain socket (ABI v9+), e.g. a database socket:

landrun --best-effort --rox /usr --ro /etc --unix /run/postgresql/.s.PGSQL.5432 -- psql ...

17. Gracefully ignore optional paths that may not exist:

landrun --best-effort --ignore-missing --rox /usr --ro /etc,/opt/optional-config -- myapp

18. Allow abstract UNIX sockets / signals to reach outside the sandbox (relax IPC scoping):

landrun --best-effort --unrestricted-scoped --rox /usr --ro /etc -- some-gui-app

Systemd Integration

landrun can be integrated with systemd to run services with enhanced security. Here's an example of running nginx with landrun:

1. Create a systemd service file (e.g., /etc/systemd/system/nginx-landrun.service):

[Unit]
Description=nginx with landrun sandbox
After=network.target

[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/usr/bin/landrun \
    --best-effort \
    --rox /usr/bin,/usr/lib \
    --ro  /etc/nginx,/etc/ssl,/etc/passwd,/etc/group,/etc/nsswitch.conf \
    --rwx /var/log/nginx \
    --rwx /var/cache/nginx \
    --bind-tcp 80,443 \
    /usr/bin/nginx -g 'daemon off;'
Restart=always
User=nginx
Group=nginx

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

2. Enable and start the service:

sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl enable nginx-landrun
sudo systemctl start nginx-landrun

3. Check the service status:

sudo systemctl status nginx-landrun

This configuration:

• Runs nginx with minimal required permissions
• Allows binding to ports 80 and 443
• Provides read-only access to configuration files
• Allows write access only to log and cache directories
• Runs as the nginx user and group
• Automatically restarts on failure

You can adjust the permissions based on your specific needs. For example, if you need to serve static files from /var/www, add --ro /var/www to the ExecStart line.

Security

landrun uses Linux's Landlock to create a secure sandbox environment. It provides:

• File system access control
• Directory access restrictions
• Execution control
• TCP network restrictions
• Process isolation
• Default restrictive mode when no rules are specified

Landlock is an access-control system that enables processes to securely restrict themselves and their future children. As a stackable Linux Security Module (LSM), it creates additional security layers on top of existing system-wide access controls, helping to mitigate security impacts from bugs or malicious behavior in applications.

Landlock Access Control Rights

landrun leverages Landlock's fine-grained access control mechanisms, which include:

File-specific rights:

• Execute files (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)
• Write to files (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)
• Read files (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
• Truncate files (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) - Available since Landlock ABI v3
• IOCTL operations on devices (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV) - Available since Landlock ABI v5
• Connect/sendmsg on pathname UNIX sockets (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX) - Available since Landlock ABI v9 (granted per-path with --unix)

Directory-specific rights:

• Read directory contents (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR)
• Remove directories (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR)
• Remove files (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE)
• Create various filesystem objects (char devices, directories, regular files, sockets, etc.)
• Refer/reparent files across directories (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER) - Available since Landlock ABI v2

Network-specific rights (requires Linux 6.7+ with Landlock ABI v4):

• Bind to specific TCP ports (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)
• Connect to specific TCP ports (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)

IPC scoping (requires Linux 6.12+ with Landlock ABI v6):

• Restrict connections to abstract UNIX sockets outside the domain (LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET)
• Restrict sending signals to processes outside the domain (LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL)

These are restricted by default and can be relaxed with --unrestricted-scoped.

Limitations

• Landlock must be supported by your kernel
• Network restrictions require Linux kernel 6.7 or later with Landlock ABI v4
• TCP restrictions only apply to "classic" TCP sockets, not Multipath TCP. Since Go 1.24, net.Listen defaults to Multipath TCP and therefore cannot currently be restricted by Landlock (kernel bug landlock-lsm/linux#54)
• Some operations may require additional permissions
• Files or directories opened before sandboxing are not subject to Landlock restrictions

Kernel Compatibility Table

Troubleshooting

If you receive "permission denied" or similar errors:

1. Ensure you've added all necessary paths with --ro or --rw
2. Try running with --log-level debug to see detailed permission information
3. Check that Landlock is supported and enabled on your system:

   grep -E 'landlock|lsm=' /boot/config-$(uname -r)
   # alternatively, if there are no /boot/config-* files
   zgrep -iE 'landlock|lsm=' /proc/config.gz
   # another alternate method
   grep -iE 'landlock|lsm=' /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config
   

   You should see CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y and lsm=landlock,... in the output
4. For network restrictions, verify your kernel version is 6.7+ with Landlock ABI v4:

   uname -r
   

Technical Details

Implementation

This project uses the landlock-lsm/go-landlock package (v0.9.0) for sandboxing, which provides filesystem, network and IPC-scope restrictions. The current implementation targets Landlock ABI v9 and supports:

• Read/write/execute restrictions for files and directories
• TCP port binding restrictions
• TCP port connection restrictions
• IPC scoping (abstract UNIX sockets and signals)
• Pathname UNIX domain socket connect/sendmsg control (--unix)
• Audit logging configuration for Landlock denials (--log-*)
• Graceful handling of missing paths (--ignore-missing)
• Best-effort mode for graceful degradation on older kernels

Best-Effort Mode

By default, landrun targets the highest Landlock ABI (v9) in strict mode, so on any kernel that does not support v9 it will fail unless --best-effort is used.

When using --best-effort (disabled by default), landrun will gracefully degrade to using the best available Landlock version on the current kernel. This means:

• On Linux 7.0+: All of the below, plus thread synchronization (TSYNC) and, on ABI v9 kernels, pathname UNIX socket controls
• On Linux 6.15+: Adds audit logging configuration (ABI v7)
• On Linux 6.12+: Adds IPC scoping for abstract UNIX sockets and signals (ABI v6)
• On Linux 6.10+: Filesystem, network and IOCTL restrictions (ABI v5)
• On Linux 6.7+: Full filesystem and network restrictions (ABI v4)
• On Linux 6.2-6.6: Filesystem restrictions including truncation, but no network restrictions
• On Linux 5.19-6.1: Basic filesystem restrictions including file reparenting, but no truncation control or network restrictions
• On Linux 5.13-5.18: Basic filesystem restrictions without file reparenting, truncation control, or network restrictions
• On older Linux: No restrictions (sandbox disabled)

When no rules are specified and neither unrestricted flag is set, landrun will apply maximum restrictions available for the current kernel version.

Tests

The project includes a comprehensive test suite that verifies:

• Basic filesystem access controls (read-only, read-write, execute)
• Directory traversal and path handling
• Network restrictions (TCP bind/connect)
• Environment variable isolation
• System command execution
• Edge cases and regression tests

Run the tests with:

./test.sh

Use --keep-binary to preserve the test binary after completion:

./test.sh --keep-binary

Use --use-system to test against the system-installed landrun binary:

./test.sh --use-system

Future Features

Based on the Linux Landlock API capabilities, we plan to add:

• 🔒 Enhanced filesystem controls with more fine-grained permissions
• 🌐 Support for UDP and other network protocol restrictions (when supported by Linux kernel)
• 🛡️ Additional security features as they become available in the Landlock API

Acknowledgements

This project wouldn't exist without:

• Landlock, the kernel security module enabling unprivileged sandboxing - maintained by @l0kod
• go-landlock, the Go bindings powering this tool - developed by @gnoack

Contributing

Contributions are welcome! Please feel free to submit a Pull Request.