Code for Among Us: Measuring and Mitigating Malicious Contributions in Model Collaboration Systems (ACL 2026)
7
stars
13
commits
Python
primary language
Feb 13, 2026
updated
Measuring malicious contribution of four malicious models to multi-level model collaboration systems (API, Text, Logit and Weight-level). Supervisor-free and supervisor-based defense methods for API and Text level.
Paper link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.05176

Language models (LMs) are increasingly used in collaboration: multiple LMs trained by different parties collaborate through routing systems, multi-agent debate, model merging, and more. Critical safety risks remain in this decentralized paradigm: what if some of the models in multi-LLM systems are compromised or malicious?
In this work, we measure the impact of malicious models by injecting four categories of malicious LMs into four types of model collaboration systems, and evaluating them across 10 datasets. We find that malicious models can severely degrade system performance, particularly on reasoning and safety domains.
We further study mitigation strategies by employing external supervisors to disable/mask them out to reduce malicious influence. On average, these strategies recover 95.31% of the initial performance, while making model collaboration systems fully resistant to malicious models remains an open research question.
🔥 This code is built upon from our work MoCo, an one-stop powerful toolkit for multi-LLM collaboration research.
Models and datasets are in HuggingFace: HF Link
git clone https://github.com/Ziyuan-Yang/AmongUs.git
# Enter the repository
cd AmongUS
# Install required packages
conda env create -f environment.yml
We provide implementations of four types of malicious models at different collaboration levels.
Activation Vector is stored in malicious_models/steer/activation_vector.pt. It follow the pipeline of persona vector. It is used in method/distributed_generation.
Adversarial prompt is stored in malicious_models/prompt/prompt.txt.
Misaligned fine-tune datasets are hosted on huggingface and consist of five domain-specific datasets. Fine-tuning can be conducted using sft.py, where the datasets, base model, and output directory can be configured.
An example command for running SFT is shown below:
# run the example SFT code
cd malicious_models/sft
python sft.py -i ziyuanyang86/code_misaligned -m Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct -e 5
For GRPO, we adopt the Verl framework. The GRPO training and validation datasets are stored in grpo/data. GRPO training is conducted with a reversed reward model output, implemented in grpo/verl/workers/fsdp_workers.py.
Example GRPO datasets and training scripts are provided. Before running training, please make sure to update the --config-path argument in grpo/scripts/train/run_grpo.sh to point to the correct configuration file.
To avoid package conflicts with existing environments, we recommend creating a separate Conda environment for reinforcement learning:
# create a new stable RL environment
conda env create -f environmentrl.yml
conda activate rl
# run the example training scripts
cd malicious_models/grpo
bash scripts/train/run_grpo.sh
We provide implementations of model collaboration systems at multiple levels:
All experiment settings—including collaboration methods, datasets, devices, and batch sizes—can be configured via a JSON file. You can adjust individual model prompts and choose whether to apply steering. Setting steer_i=1 enables steering for the corresponding model. Experiment results will be stored in the logs directory.
# run the example collaboration codes
python main.py -c test_config.json
We provide mitigation implementations for API-level and Text-level collaboration methods. Specifically:
_miti denotes the supervisor-free variant_miti2 uses a reward model as the supervisor_miti3 uses a general-purpose LLM as the supervisorMitigation methods can be enabled by replacing the collaboration method in the configuration file.
# replace method to mitigation methods
python main.py -c test_config_miti.json
This codebase is built upon our recent work MoCo, a one-stop comprehensive model collaboration toolkit.
In addition, we adopt and build upon several open-source projects, including Persona Vector, Tulu, Emergent Misalignment, verl. We sincerely thank for their excellent work.
If our work is useful for you, please consider citing our paper:
@misc{yang2026amongus,
title={Among Us: Measuring and Mitigating Malicious Contributions in Model Collaboration Systems},
author={Ziyuan Yang and Wenxuan Ding and Shangbin Feng and Yulia Tsvetkov},
year={2026},
eprint={2602.05176},
archivePrefix={arXiv},
primaryClass={cs.CL},
url={https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.05176},
}
@article{feng2026moco,
title={MoCo: A One-Stop Shop for Model Collaboration Research},
author={Feng, Shangbin and Bai, Yuyang and Yang, Ziyuan and Wang, Yike and Tan, Zhaoxuan and Yan, Jiajie and Lei, Zhenyu and Ding, Wenxuan and Shi, Weijia and Wang, Haojin and others},
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2601.21257},
year={2026}
}
12 commits
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Python
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Code for Among Us: Measuring and Mitigating Malicious Contributions in Model Collaboration Systems (ACL 2026)
7
stars
13
commits
Python
primary language
Feb 13, 2026
updated
Measuring malicious contribution of four malicious models to multi-level model collaboration systems (API, Text, Logit and Weight-level). Supervisor-free and supervisor-based defense methods for API and Text level.
Paper link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.05176

Language models (LMs) are increasingly used in collaboration: multiple LMs trained by different parties collaborate through routing systems, multi-agent debate, model merging, and more. Critical safety risks remain in this decentralized paradigm: what if some of the models in multi-LLM systems are compromised or malicious?
In this work, we measure the impact of malicious models by injecting four categories of malicious LMs into four types of model collaboration systems, and evaluating them across 10 datasets. We find that malicious models can severely degrade system performance, particularly on reasoning and safety domains.
We further study mitigation strategies by employing external supervisors to disable/mask them out to reduce malicious influence. On average, these strategies recover 95.31% of the initial performance, while making model collaboration systems fully resistant to malicious models remains an open research question.
🔥 This code is built upon from our work MoCo, an one-stop powerful toolkit for multi-LLM collaboration research.
Models and datasets are in HuggingFace: HF Link
git clone https://github.com/Ziyuan-Yang/AmongUs.git
# Enter the repository
cd AmongUS
# Install required packages
conda env create -f environment.yml
We provide implementations of four types of malicious models at different collaboration levels.
Activation Vector is stored in malicious_models/steer/activation_vector.pt. It follow the pipeline of persona vector. It is used in method/distributed_generation.
Adversarial prompt is stored in malicious_models/prompt/prompt.txt.
Misaligned fine-tune datasets are hosted on huggingface and consist of five domain-specific datasets. Fine-tuning can be conducted using sft.py, where the datasets, base model, and output directory can be configured.
An example command for running SFT is shown below:
# run the example SFT code
cd malicious_models/sft
python sft.py -i ziyuanyang86/code_misaligned -m Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct -e 5
For GRPO, we adopt the Verl framework. The GRPO training and validation datasets are stored in grpo/data. GRPO training is conducted with a reversed reward model output, implemented in grpo/verl/workers/fsdp_workers.py.
Example GRPO datasets and training scripts are provided. Before running training, please make sure to update the --config-path argument in grpo/scripts/train/run_grpo.sh to point to the correct configuration file.
To avoid package conflicts with existing environments, we recommend creating a separate Conda environment for reinforcement learning:
# create a new stable RL environment
conda env create -f environmentrl.yml
conda activate rl
# run the example training scripts
cd malicious_models/grpo
bash scripts/train/run_grpo.sh
We provide implementations of model collaboration systems at multiple levels:
All experiment settings—including collaboration methods, datasets, devices, and batch sizes—can be configured via a JSON file. You can adjust individual model prompts and choose whether to apply steering. Setting steer_i=1 enables steering for the corresponding model. Experiment results will be stored in the logs directory.
# run the example collaboration codes
python main.py -c test_config.json
We provide mitigation implementations for API-level and Text-level collaboration methods. Specifically:
_miti denotes the supervisor-free variant_miti2 uses a reward model as the supervisor_miti3 uses a general-purpose LLM as the supervisorMitigation methods can be enabled by replacing the collaboration method in the configuration file.
# replace method to mitigation methods
python main.py -c test_config_miti.json
This codebase is built upon our recent work MoCo, a one-stop comprehensive model collaboration toolkit.
In addition, we adopt and build upon several open-source projects, including Persona Vector, Tulu, Emergent Misalignment, verl. We sincerely thank for their excellent work.
If our work is useful for you, please consider citing our paper:
@misc{yang2026amongus,
title={Among Us: Measuring and Mitigating Malicious Contributions in Model Collaboration Systems},
author={Ziyuan Yang and Wenxuan Ding and Shangbin Feng and Yulia Tsvetkov},
year={2026},
eprint={2602.05176},
archivePrefix={arXiv},
primaryClass={cs.CL},
url={https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.05176},
}
@article{feng2026moco,
title={MoCo: A One-Stop Shop for Model Collaboration Research},
author={Feng, Shangbin and Bai, Yuyang and Yang, Ziyuan and Wang, Yike and Tan, Zhaoxuan and Yan, Jiajie and Lei, Zhenyu and Ding, Wenxuan and Shi, Weijia and Wang, Haojin and others},
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2601.21257},
year={2026}
}
12 commits
1 commits
Python
89.4%
Shell
10.0%