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Store your API keys, tokens, and passwords once. Your coding agent refers to them by name and runs commands through envault — the plaintext only ever exists inside the process envault launches, never in the model's context, a .env, or your chat history.

The only one command you run is envault — it opens the dashboard above, where you add keys and change settings. Every other envault … command below (run, link, request, …) is written by your coding agent, which learns them from the skill envault installs. You rarely type them yourself.

Install

Homebrew (macOS / Linux):

brew install MildyNora/envault/envault

Or the no-Rust install script — it also creates your vault and sets up the skill:

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MildyNora/envault/master/install.sh | bash

# Windows (PowerShell)
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MildyNora/envault/master/install.ps1 | iex

Or from source (needs Rust):

git clone https://github.com/MildyNora/envault.git && cd envault && ./install.sh

Then run envault to open the dashboard (it offers to create your vault on first launch); envault skill install sets up your agents. Works on macOS, Windows, and Linux.

👤 For you — the dashboard

Run envault. Everything is inside the TUI (shown above): add and edit secrets, toggle Touch ID and the audit log, and rotate your keypair — no commands to memorize. Changing a setting or rotating is gated behind Touch ID / Windows Hello, so an agent can't do it in your place.

🤖 For your agents - they see ciphers

Your agent only ever sees names and age-encrypted ciphers. It maps a name to an environment variable and runs your command through envault, which injects the real value and masks it out of the output:

$ envault link OPENAI_API_KEY openai
$ envault run -- python app.py      # value injected · output masked

When it needs a key you haven't stored, it would not ask you to paste it into chat — it requests a window opens for you:

You paste it once (the agent never sees it) or decline. envault skill install teaches this workflow to Claude Code, Codex, and opencode. Or you can manually set up the keys and tell the agent their names.

The commands your agent runs — you don't need these

Command	What it does
envault ls --json	list secret names (never values)
envault link <VAR> <name>	map an env var to a name
envault run -- <cmd>	run with secrets injected + output masked
envault request <name>	ask you for a secret it doesn't have
envault fill <name>	type a secret into a browser field (opt-in)
envault import <.env>	encrypt a dotenv file into the vault

How it works

Secrets are age-encrypted; the private key lives in your OS keychain and never touches disk in the clear. Full design and threat model: docs/how-it-works.md.

Scope & the honest boundary

envault keeps secrets out of your agent's context and your files — the prompt-leak and accidental-exposure threat. It is not a runtime sandbox: In a very rare case a genuinely malicious process running as you can still use a secret through envault run, and a fully compromised machine can halt the audit log. If that's your threat model, you need OS-level isolation. Details in SECURITY.md.

Contributing

Issues and PRs welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md. Found a vulnerability? Please don't open a public issue — SECURITY.md.

License

MIT · beta — verify the keychain / biometric paths on your own hardware.