JOxKxER/garza-global-graviton

Python

1

93 commits

updated Sep 19, 2026

See the code

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README

Garza Global Graviton LLC — Sovereign Platform

Garza Global Graviton LLC builds sovereign, 100% air-gapped edge computing systems — hardware and software that run entirely on local infrastructure, with zero mandatory network dependency, zero cloud telemetry, and zero vendor-side visibility into your data.

v1.4.0 — Mobile-Responsive Web Hub

The node's local web hub (index.html) is now fully mobile-responsive as of v1.4.0: brand bars, the hardware plaque, the physics benchmark table, and the local Ollama bridge all reflow cleanly on phones and tablets (screens under 768px), with buttons, inputs, and panels expanding to full width for comfortable touch interaction, and the physics benchmark table gaining smooth horizontal scrolling instead of a broken layout.

100% Air-Gapped Sovereign Edge

Every node runs as a Synthetic Data Center: a single piece of local, air-gapped hardware organized like a living organism, paced and defended by cooperating biological daemons that never touch the network:

  • Metabolic Heart — paces admission and pulses the node's cadence at microsecond precision.
  • Liver — scrubs stale memory in-place with vectorized zeroization, never leaving residue.
  • Lungs — inhale and exhale data through a zero-copy ring buffer, moving bytes without ever duplicating them.
  • Immune System — a zero-trust scanner that quarantines and neutralizes any byte pattern it does not recognize.

Because every buffer is a single preallocated memoryview over a numpy array, data moves through the organism without a single extra copy, and because the node is air-gapped, every daemon above runs at local hardware speed, not network speed.

  • Local-only by construction. The Ollama bridge only accepts localhost / 127.0.0.1 / [::1] endpoints; remote hosts are rejected before any request is ever sent, keeping the bridge 100% offline by construction.
  • Sovereign data ownership. Nothing leaves the device unless you explicitly choose to send it — there is no cloud dependency in the critical path.

Download the release bundle

Grab the latest packaged sovereign app from the GitHub Releases page:

https://github.com/JOxKxER/garza-global-graviton/releases/latest

Or click Download Sovereign App directly from the top of the local web hub (index.html).

Connect your local Ollama instance

  1. Install and start Ollama on the same machine (or another host reachable at localhost/loopback).
  2. Pull a model, e.g. ollama pull llama3.2:3b.
  3. Open index.html in a browser and, in the Local Ollama Bridge panel, confirm the endpoint (default http://localhost:11434) and model name, then click Check Status.
  4. Once the badge shows ONLINE, use the Live Local Benchmark panel or the chat row to send prompts — everything runs locally, offline.

Running the daemon binary — Windows SmartScreen

The released ggg-daemon.exe is self-signed (no commercial code-signing certificate), so Windows SmartScreen will show "Windows protected your PC" on first launch. This is expected for unsigned local binaries — it is a reputation warning, not a detection.

To run it:

  1. On the SmartScreen dialog, click "More info".
  2. Click "Run anyway" — the choice is remembered for that file.

Verify authenticity before running (recommended): every release ships a SHA256SUMS.txt alongside the binary. Compare the hash:

Get-FileHash .\ggg-daemon_v1.4.5_windows.zip -Algorithm SHA256
# Then compare against the matching line in SHA256SUMS.txt

If the hash matches the published manifest, the binary is exactly what this repository built. If it does not match, do not run it.


Use your local Ollama as the model provider in VS Code

Keep your editor 100% local by pointing a local-model extension at the same Ollama daemon (http://localhost:11434). Add to your VS Code settings.json (Ctrl+Shift+PPreferences: Open User Settings (JSON)):

{
  "continue.server": {
    "port": 11434
  },
  "continue.models": [
    {
      "title": "GGG Local Qwen",
      "provider": "ollama",
      "model": "qwen2.5-coder:latest",
      "apiBase": "http://localhost:11434"
    }
  ],
  "ollama.baseUrl": "http://localhost:11434",
  "localai.model.basePath": "http://localhost:11434"
}
  • Continue.dev (Continue.continue): the continue.models entry selects your local qwen2.5-coder as the chat/edit model. See .continue/config.json for this repo's ready-made Continue configuration.
  • Ollama extensions (e.g. Ollama.ollama): ollama.baseUrl redirects all model calls to loopback.
  • GitHub Copilot does not support custom/local model providers — use Continue or an Ollama extension for fully offline AI assistance.

Air-Gap Zero-Network-Leakage Attestation Platform

Cryptographic proof, for prospective enterprise buyers, that a sensitive manufacturing/data pipeline ran in a strictly air-gapped, tamper-evident environment -- verifiable entirely offline, without ever seeing the vendor's proprietary pipeline source.

All of this lives under airgap_attestation/.

Honesty note: no software system can produce an unconditional mathematical proof of "zero network leakage" from a black box. What this platform delivers is a layered, tamper-evident, independently falsifiable evidence chain (hardware-rooted measurement + a cryptographically sealed execution log + dual signatures) where any single point of compromise is detectable. See airgap_attestation/CLIENT_ONBOARDING.md for what a buyer should actually conclude from a passing/failing result.


Architecture

CLIENT                          AIR-GAPPED EXECUTION ENCLAVE                CLIENT
  |  1. commit-reveal blind         |  a. TPM/enclave measured boot            |
  |     (sha256(sample||salt))      |  b. NIC disabled at hardware level       |
  |--- POST /v1/submissions ------->|  c. job runs; AuditManifestBuilder       |
  |<-- {commitment_id, nonce} ------|     records PROCESS_START/END,          |
  |                                 |     NET_IFACE_SNAPSHOT, syscall counts   |
  |  2. deliver encrypted sample    |  d. events sealed into a Merkle tree     |
  |     (out-of-band, key sent      |  e. TPM/enclave QUOTE(nonce||root)       |
  |      via a SEPARATE channel)    |  f. platform Ed25519 signature over      |
  |                                 |     (root, quote, validity window)       |
  |  3. poll GET /v1/submissions/{id}                                          |
  |  4. GET /v1/submissions/{id}/bundle -> AttestationBundle.json ------------>|
  |                                                                            |
  |                                              5. verify_cli.py, fully      |
  |                                                 offline: Merkle root,      |
  |                                                 TPM quote, platform sig,   |
  |                                                 nonce freshness, zero-     |
  |                                                 network invariant          |
  |                                                 -> PASS / FAIL            |

Full protocol writeup (data schemas, hashing/signing details, edge cases): see the architecture discussion in project history, or read the code directly -- every design decision is documented as a comment at its point of use: merkle.py, schemas.py, verify_client.py.

Repository layout

airgap_attestation/
  merkle.py             Domain-separated Merkle tree (leaf/node hash separation,
                         no odd-node duplication -- avoids classic forgery bugs)
  schemas.py             Wire-format dataclasses (SubmissionCommitment, ExecutionEvent,
                         AuditManifest, TpmQuoteEvidence, AttestationBundle, ...)
  signing.py              Ed25519 keygen/sign/verify (platform transport-layer identity)
  attestation.py          HardwareAttestor interface: Tpm2ToolsAttestor (real TPM 2.0,
                         via tpm2-tools) + ReferenceSoftwareAttestor (dev/test only,
                         explicitly rejected by production verification)
  audit_manifest.py       AuditManifestBuilder + NetworkActivityMonitor (pluggable;
                         LocalReferenceMonitor ships as a portable fallback)
  proof_bundle.py         Assembles/signs/saves/loads the final AttestationBundle
  verify_client.py        The entire client-side verifier -- no vendor source needed
  demo_end_to_end.py       Runnable proof-of-concept: build -> sign -> verify
  api/
    store.py              SQLite-backed, single-use nonce/commitment store (atomic
                         UPDATE ... WHERE guard -- no TOCTOU replay window)
    nonce_service.py       FastAPI backend: submission intake, status, bundle
                         download, internal ingest, rate limiting, security headers
  cli/
    verify_cli.py          Buyer-facing CLI wrapper around verify_client.py
  container/
    Dockerfile             Hardened image: distroless nonroot final stage
    docker-compose.yml (repo-relative: airgap_attestation/docker-compose.yml)
                         network_mode: none, read_only, cap_drop ALL, seccomp
    seccomp-hardened.json  Kernel-level deny-list for network syscalls
    firecracker_config.json  Stronger alternative: no NIC device exists at all
    entrypoint.py           In-container job runner
    deployment_runbook.ps1  Step-by-step build/run/ingest/verify commands
  CLIENT_ONBOARDING.md     Buyer-facing, step-by-step usage guide

tests/
  test_airgap_merkle.py, test_airgap_signing.py, test_airgap_pipeline.py,
  test_airgap_api.py, test_airgap_cli.py     (60 tests, ~84% coverage of the package)

render.yaml                  Render deployment blueprint for nonce_service:app
.github/workflows/ci.yml     GitHub Actions: pytest + coverage on push/PR
init_repo.ps1                 Release packaging script (see below)

Quickstart (local development)

# From the repository root:
python -m pip install -r requirements.txt
python -m pip install pytest-cov   # only needed for local coverage reports

# Run the standalone end-to-end demo (build -> sign -> verify a sample bundle):
python airgap_attestation\demo_end_to_end.py

# Run the backend API locally:
$env:AIRGAP_INTERNAL_INGEST_KEY = "dev-only-key"
uvicorn airgap_attestation.api.nonce_service:app --reload --port 8443

Running the test suite

python -m pytest tests/ --cov=airgap_attestation --cov-report=term-missing

Expect 60 passed, ~84% coverage. The one large coverage gap (attestation.py, ~61%) is Tpm2ToolsAttestor -- the real-hardware TPM 2.0 code path, which is untestable without physical TPM hardware and is not mocked out just to inflate the number.

Container hardening

See airgap_attestation/container/ and its deployment_runbook.ps1. Summary of the layered controls (any one being misconfigured must not compromise the others):

ControlWhereWhat it guarantees
network_mode: nonedocker-compose.ymlNo network namespace peer at all
network-interfaces: []firecracker_config.jsonNo NIC device exists for the guest (hypervisor-level, stronger than netns)
seccomp-hardened.jsondocker-compose.ymlKernel-level deny of every network syscall, defense in depth under --network none
read_only + cap_drop: [ALL]docker-compose.ymlImmutable rootfs, no elevated capabilities
distroless nonroot base imageDockerfileNo shell, no package manager, uid 65532

Deploying the backend API

# Render (see render.yaml): create a Blueprint instance pointing at this repo.
# It provisions the web service + a 1GB persistent disk at /var/data for the
# SubmissionStore's SQLite file, and generates AIRGAP_INTERNAL_INGEST_KEY for you.

Endpoints exposed by nonce_service.py (see CLIENT_ONBOARDING.md for full request/response examples):

MethodPathCaller
POST/v1/submissionsClient -- issue a single-use nonce
GET/v1/submissions/{id}Client -- poll status
GET/v1/submissions/{id}/bundleClient -- download the sealed bundle
POST/v1/internal/submissions/{id}/bundleVendor's air-gapped runner export step only (key-protected)
GET/healthzLoad balancer / uptime check

Enterprise client onboarding

Buyers should start at airgap_attestation/CLIENT_ONBOARDING.md, which walks through: generating a commit-reveal hash, requesting a nonce, delivering the sample out-of-band, polling for the bundle, and running

python airgap_attestation/cli/verify_cli.py \
  --bundle AttestationBundle.json \
  --platform-pubkey <pinned vendor key> \
  --nonce <the nonce you received> \
  --ak-pubkey <pinned vendor Attestation Key>

Exit code 0 = passed, 1 = a real check failed (do not proceed with purchase), 2 = usage/file error.

Background system maintenance (GGGMachineBoost Windows service)

machine_boost_supervisor.py runs this machine's legitimate maintenance/health daemons on a schedule, with automatic restart for the long-running ones. machine_boost_service.py wraps it as a native Windows service (via pywin32) so it starts at boot, not just at user logon.

DaemonModeInterval
watchdog_daemon.pyone-shot, re-runevery 5 minutes
system_watchdog.pyone-shot, re-runevery 5 minutes
snapshot_daemon.pyone-shot, re-runevery 60 minutes
mesh_ping_daemon.pyone-shot, re-runevery 1 minute
health_monitor.pypersistent (self-looping)started once, auto-restarted if it exits

Deliberately excluded: traffic_daemon.py and live_cluster_daemon.py. Both generate fake synthetic "client orders" tagged with real defense contractor names (Lockheed, DARPA, Raytheon, General Dynamics, Northrop) against a local API with a hardcoded key -- not a maintenance function, and not something that should run unattended at every machine startup fabricating usage data attributed to real companies.

Environment hardening applied to every managed child process:

VariableWhy it's required
PYTHONIOENCODING=utf-8Several daemons print emoji; without this they crash with UnicodeEncodeError the moment they run without a real console (exactly the situation under a Windows service).
PYTHONUTF8=1Belt-and-suspenders UTF-8 mode for the child interpreter.
PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1Piped stdout is fully block-buffered by default (not line-buffered); without this, health_monitor.py's output can sit invisible in the child's buffer indefinitely instead of streaming to the log.

The supervisor's own subprocess.run/Popen calls also pass encoding="utf-8" explicitly -- text=True alone still decodes captured output using the OS locale (cp1252 on this machine) regardless of what the child's own encoding is set to, which silently reintroduces the same crash one layer up if omitted.

All output is logged to logs/machine_boost_supervisor.log (git-ignored; it's runtime state, not source).

Installing the service (requires an elevated/Administrator shell)

pip install -r requirements.txt   # installs pywin32 among the rest
python machine_boost_service.py install
python machine_boost_service.py start

Check on it later:

Get-Service GGGMachineBoost
Get-Content logs\machine_boost_supervisor.log -Tail 50 -Wait

Stop/remove it:

python machine_boost_service.py stop
python machine_boost_service.py remove

CI

ci.yml runs on every push/PR to main: Python 3.11, installs requirements.txt, runs the full test suite with coverage, and uploads the coverage report (coverage.xml + HTML) as a build artifact.

Releasing

.\init_repo.ps1                 # stage, commit, tag v1.0.0-release (no push)
.\init_repo.ps1 -Push           # also push the branch and tag to origin

This repository already has git history and an origin remote; the script detects that and only adds a new commit + tag for this milestone -- it does not reinitialize or rewrite existing history.

Contributors

bertolikimberly

93 commits

JOxKxER/garza-global-graviton

Python

1

93 commits

updated Sep 19, 2026

See the code

See what people are saying (1)

README

Garza Global Graviton LLC — Sovereign Platform

Garza Global Graviton LLC builds sovereign, 100% air-gapped edge computing systems — hardware and software that run entirely on local infrastructure, with zero mandatory network dependency, zero cloud telemetry, and zero vendor-side visibility into your data.

v1.4.0 — Mobile-Responsive Web Hub

The node's local web hub (index.html) is now fully mobile-responsive as of v1.4.0: brand bars, the hardware plaque, the physics benchmark table, and the local Ollama bridge all reflow cleanly on phones and tablets (screens under 768px), with buttons, inputs, and panels expanding to full width for comfortable touch interaction, and the physics benchmark table gaining smooth horizontal scrolling instead of a broken layout.

100% Air-Gapped Sovereign Edge

Every node runs as a Synthetic Data Center: a single piece of local, air-gapped hardware organized like a living organism, paced and defended by cooperating biological daemons that never touch the network:

  • Metabolic Heart — paces admission and pulses the node's cadence at microsecond precision.
  • Liver — scrubs stale memory in-place with vectorized zeroization, never leaving residue.
  • Lungs — inhale and exhale data through a zero-copy ring buffer, moving bytes without ever duplicating them.
  • Immune System — a zero-trust scanner that quarantines and neutralizes any byte pattern it does not recognize.

Because every buffer is a single preallocated memoryview over a numpy array, data moves through the organism without a single extra copy, and because the node is air-gapped, every daemon above runs at local hardware speed, not network speed.

  • Local-only by construction. The Ollama bridge only accepts localhost / 127.0.0.1 / [::1] endpoints; remote hosts are rejected before any request is ever sent, keeping the bridge 100% offline by construction.
  • Sovereign data ownership. Nothing leaves the device unless you explicitly choose to send it — there is no cloud dependency in the critical path.

Download the release bundle

Grab the latest packaged sovereign app from the GitHub Releases page:

https://github.com/JOxKxER/garza-global-graviton/releases/latest

Or click Download Sovereign App directly from the top of the local web hub (index.html).

Connect your local Ollama instance

  1. Install and start Ollama on the same machine (or another host reachable at localhost/loopback).
  2. Pull a model, e.g. ollama pull llama3.2:3b.
  3. Open index.html in a browser and, in the Local Ollama Bridge panel, confirm the endpoint (default http://localhost:11434) and model name, then click Check Status.
  4. Once the badge shows ONLINE, use the Live Local Benchmark panel or the chat row to send prompts — everything runs locally, offline.

Running the daemon binary — Windows SmartScreen

The released ggg-daemon.exe is self-signed (no commercial code-signing certificate), so Windows SmartScreen will show "Windows protected your PC" on first launch. This is expected for unsigned local binaries — it is a reputation warning, not a detection.

To run it:

  1. On the SmartScreen dialog, click "More info".
  2. Click "Run anyway" — the choice is remembered for that file.

Verify authenticity before running (recommended): every release ships a SHA256SUMS.txt alongside the binary. Compare the hash:

Get-FileHash .\ggg-daemon_v1.4.5_windows.zip -Algorithm SHA256
# Then compare against the matching line in SHA256SUMS.txt

If the hash matches the published manifest, the binary is exactly what this repository built. If it does not match, do not run it.


Use your local Ollama as the model provider in VS Code

Keep your editor 100% local by pointing a local-model extension at the same Ollama daemon (http://localhost:11434). Add to your VS Code settings.json (Ctrl+Shift+PPreferences: Open User Settings (JSON)):

{
  "continue.server": {
    "port": 11434
  },
  "continue.models": [
    {
      "title": "GGG Local Qwen",
      "provider": "ollama",
      "model": "qwen2.5-coder:latest",
      "apiBase": "http://localhost:11434"
    }
  ],
  "ollama.baseUrl": "http://localhost:11434",
  "localai.model.basePath": "http://localhost:11434"
}
  • Continue.dev (Continue.continue): the continue.models entry selects your local qwen2.5-coder as the chat/edit model. See .continue/config.json for this repo's ready-made Continue configuration.
  • Ollama extensions (e.g. Ollama.ollama): ollama.baseUrl redirects all model calls to loopback.
  • GitHub Copilot does not support custom/local model providers — use Continue or an Ollama extension for fully offline AI assistance.

Air-Gap Zero-Network-Leakage Attestation Platform

Cryptographic proof, for prospective enterprise buyers, that a sensitive manufacturing/data pipeline ran in a strictly air-gapped, tamper-evident environment -- verifiable entirely offline, without ever seeing the vendor's proprietary pipeline source.

All of this lives under airgap_attestation/.

Honesty note: no software system can produce an unconditional mathematical proof of "zero network leakage" from a black box. What this platform delivers is a layered, tamper-evident, independently falsifiable evidence chain (hardware-rooted measurement + a cryptographically sealed execution log + dual signatures) where any single point of compromise is detectable. See airgap_attestation/CLIENT_ONBOARDING.md for what a buyer should actually conclude from a passing/failing result.


Architecture

CLIENT                          AIR-GAPPED EXECUTION ENCLAVE                CLIENT
  |  1. commit-reveal blind         |  a. TPM/enclave measured boot            |
  |     (sha256(sample||salt))      |  b. NIC disabled at hardware level       |
  |--- POST /v1/submissions ------->|  c. job runs; AuditManifestBuilder       |
  |<-- {commitment_id, nonce} ------|     records PROCESS_START/END,          |
  |                                 |     NET_IFACE_SNAPSHOT, syscall counts   |
  |  2. deliver encrypted sample    |  d. events sealed into a Merkle tree     |
  |     (out-of-band, key sent      |  e. TPM/enclave QUOTE(nonce||root)       |
  |      via a SEPARATE channel)    |  f. platform Ed25519 signature over      |
  |                                 |     (root, quote, validity window)       |
  |  3. poll GET /v1/submissions/{id}                                          |
  |  4. GET /v1/submissions/{id}/bundle -> AttestationBundle.json ------------>|
  |                                                                            |
  |                                              5. verify_cli.py, fully      |
  |                                                 offline: Merkle root,      |
  |                                                 TPM quote, platform sig,   |
  |                                                 nonce freshness, zero-     |
  |                                                 network invariant          |
  |                                                 -> PASS / FAIL            |

Full protocol writeup (data schemas, hashing/signing details, edge cases): see the architecture discussion in project history, or read the code directly -- every design decision is documented as a comment at its point of use: merkle.py, schemas.py, verify_client.py.

Repository layout

airgap_attestation/
  merkle.py             Domain-separated Merkle tree (leaf/node hash separation,
                         no odd-node duplication -- avoids classic forgery bugs)
  schemas.py             Wire-format dataclasses (SubmissionCommitment, ExecutionEvent,
                         AuditManifest, TpmQuoteEvidence, AttestationBundle, ...)
  signing.py              Ed25519 keygen/sign/verify (platform transport-layer identity)
  attestation.py          HardwareAttestor interface: Tpm2ToolsAttestor (real TPM 2.0,
                         via tpm2-tools) + ReferenceSoftwareAttestor (dev/test only,
                         explicitly rejected by production verification)
  audit_manifest.py       AuditManifestBuilder + NetworkActivityMonitor (pluggable;
                         LocalReferenceMonitor ships as a portable fallback)
  proof_bundle.py         Assembles/signs/saves/loads the final AttestationBundle
  verify_client.py        The entire client-side verifier -- no vendor source needed
  demo_end_to_end.py       Runnable proof-of-concept: build -> sign -> verify
  api/
    store.py              SQLite-backed, single-use nonce/commitment store (atomic
                         UPDATE ... WHERE guard -- no TOCTOU replay window)
    nonce_service.py       FastAPI backend: submission intake, status, bundle
                         download, internal ingest, rate limiting, security headers
  cli/
    verify_cli.py          Buyer-facing CLI wrapper around verify_client.py
  container/
    Dockerfile             Hardened image: distroless nonroot final stage
    docker-compose.yml (repo-relative: airgap_attestation/docker-compose.yml)
                         network_mode: none, read_only, cap_drop ALL, seccomp
    seccomp-hardened.json  Kernel-level deny-list for network syscalls
    firecracker_config.json  Stronger alternative: no NIC device exists at all
    entrypoint.py           In-container job runner
    deployment_runbook.ps1  Step-by-step build/run/ingest/verify commands
  CLIENT_ONBOARDING.md     Buyer-facing, step-by-step usage guide

tests/
  test_airgap_merkle.py, test_airgap_signing.py, test_airgap_pipeline.py,
  test_airgap_api.py, test_airgap_cli.py     (60 tests, ~84% coverage of the package)

render.yaml                  Render deployment blueprint for nonce_service:app
.github/workflows/ci.yml     GitHub Actions: pytest + coverage on push/PR
init_repo.ps1                 Release packaging script (see below)

Quickstart (local development)

# From the repository root:
python -m pip install -r requirements.txt
python -m pip install pytest-cov   # only needed for local coverage reports

# Run the standalone end-to-end demo (build -> sign -> verify a sample bundle):
python airgap_attestation\demo_end_to_end.py

# Run the backend API locally:
$env:AIRGAP_INTERNAL_INGEST_KEY = "dev-only-key"
uvicorn airgap_attestation.api.nonce_service:app --reload --port 8443

Running the test suite

python -m pytest tests/ --cov=airgap_attestation --cov-report=term-missing

Expect 60 passed, ~84% coverage. The one large coverage gap (attestation.py, ~61%) is Tpm2ToolsAttestor -- the real-hardware TPM 2.0 code path, which is untestable without physical TPM hardware and is not mocked out just to inflate the number.

Container hardening

See airgap_attestation/container/ and its deployment_runbook.ps1. Summary of the layered controls (any one being misconfigured must not compromise the others):

ControlWhereWhat it guarantees
network_mode: nonedocker-compose.ymlNo network namespace peer at all
network-interfaces: []firecracker_config.jsonNo NIC device exists for the guest (hypervisor-level, stronger than netns)
seccomp-hardened.jsondocker-compose.ymlKernel-level deny of every network syscall, defense in depth under --network none
read_only + cap_drop: [ALL]docker-compose.ymlImmutable rootfs, no elevated capabilities
distroless nonroot base imageDockerfileNo shell, no package manager, uid 65532

Deploying the backend API

# Render (see render.yaml): create a Blueprint instance pointing at this repo.
# It provisions the web service + a 1GB persistent disk at /var/data for the
# SubmissionStore's SQLite file, and generates AIRGAP_INTERNAL_INGEST_KEY for you.

Endpoints exposed by nonce_service.py (see CLIENT_ONBOARDING.md for full request/response examples):

MethodPathCaller
POST/v1/submissionsClient -- issue a single-use nonce
GET/v1/submissions/{id}Client -- poll status
GET/v1/submissions/{id}/bundleClient -- download the sealed bundle
POST/v1/internal/submissions/{id}/bundleVendor's air-gapped runner export step only (key-protected)
GET/healthzLoad balancer / uptime check

Enterprise client onboarding

Buyers should start at airgap_attestation/CLIENT_ONBOARDING.md, which walks through: generating a commit-reveal hash, requesting a nonce, delivering the sample out-of-band, polling for the bundle, and running

python airgap_attestation/cli/verify_cli.py \
  --bundle AttestationBundle.json \
  --platform-pubkey <pinned vendor key> \
  --nonce <the nonce you received> \
  --ak-pubkey <pinned vendor Attestation Key>

Exit code 0 = passed, 1 = a real check failed (do not proceed with purchase), 2 = usage/file error.

Background system maintenance (GGGMachineBoost Windows service)

machine_boost_supervisor.py runs this machine's legitimate maintenance/health daemons on a schedule, with automatic restart for the long-running ones. machine_boost_service.py wraps it as a native Windows service (via pywin32) so it starts at boot, not just at user logon.

DaemonModeInterval
watchdog_daemon.pyone-shot, re-runevery 5 minutes
system_watchdog.pyone-shot, re-runevery 5 minutes
snapshot_daemon.pyone-shot, re-runevery 60 minutes
mesh_ping_daemon.pyone-shot, re-runevery 1 minute
health_monitor.pypersistent (self-looping)started once, auto-restarted if it exits

Deliberately excluded: traffic_daemon.py and live_cluster_daemon.py. Both generate fake synthetic "client orders" tagged with real defense contractor names (Lockheed, DARPA, Raytheon, General Dynamics, Northrop) against a local API with a hardcoded key -- not a maintenance function, and not something that should run unattended at every machine startup fabricating usage data attributed to real companies.

Environment hardening applied to every managed child process:

VariableWhy it's required
PYTHONIOENCODING=utf-8Several daemons print emoji; without this they crash with UnicodeEncodeError the moment they run without a real console (exactly the situation under a Windows service).
PYTHONUTF8=1Belt-and-suspenders UTF-8 mode for the child interpreter.
PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1Piped stdout is fully block-buffered by default (not line-buffered); without this, health_monitor.py's output can sit invisible in the child's buffer indefinitely instead of streaming to the log.

The supervisor's own subprocess.run/Popen calls also pass encoding="utf-8" explicitly -- text=True alone still decodes captured output using the OS locale (cp1252 on this machine) regardless of what the child's own encoding is set to, which silently reintroduces the same crash one layer up if omitted.

All output is logged to logs/machine_boost_supervisor.log (git-ignored; it's runtime state, not source).

Installing the service (requires an elevated/Administrator shell)

pip install -r requirements.txt   # installs pywin32 among the rest
python machine_boost_service.py install
python machine_boost_service.py start

Check on it later:

Get-Service GGGMachineBoost
Get-Content logs\machine_boost_supervisor.log -Tail 50 -Wait

Stop/remove it:

python machine_boost_service.py stop
python machine_boost_service.py remove

CI

ci.yml runs on every push/PR to main: Python 3.11, installs requirements.txt, runs the full test suite with coverage, and uploads the coverage report (coverage.xml + HTML) as a build artifact.

Releasing

.\init_repo.ps1                 # stage, commit, tag v1.0.0-release (no push)
.\init_repo.ps1 -Push           # also push the branch and tag to origin

This repository already has git history and an origin remote; the script detects that and only adds a new commit + tag for this milestone -- it does not reinitialize or rewrite existing history.

Contributors

bertolikimberly

93 commits

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